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INTRODUCTION

Studying the regulation of monopolistic pricing provides meaningful insight into the basic nature of an antitrust system. Comparing the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC) treatment of monopolistic pricing is particularly
informative because the EEC antitrust provisions are based on
the Sherman Act and the monopolization sections are quite similar. The regulation of the pricing behavior of monopolists in the
two systems, however, differs significantly, primarily because of
the distinct differences between European and United States antitrust philosophies.
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome outlaws any "abuse ... of a
dominant position within the common market or a substantial
part of it."' The EEC prohibition is similar to the developed
meaning of "monopolization" in section 2 of the Sherman Act 2 ,
requiring both market power and improper conduct.' This Article
analyzes the type of conduct that is considered improper: specifically, the pricing practices that constitute abuse under article 86,
or monopolization under section 2.
Article 86 provides examples that help determine what abuse
is:
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfairpurchase or selling prices
or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
1. Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force

Jan. 1, 1958) (emphasis added). Quotations and subsequent references to the
Treaty are to the official English language version, Office for Official Publica-

tions of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1973.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactionswith
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts. 4

These examples do not resemble the kinds of conduct that fit
the principal United States test for monopolization: the willful
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. The examples, in
contrast, represent types of conduct by which monopoly power is
exploited. Thus, the early scholarly analysis concluded that article 86 prohibits exploitation, but not predation; the article does
not forbid anticompetitive conduct.' This view, however, did not
survive the first Court of Justice decision in a case initiated by
the Commission under article 86. In Europemballage Corp. v.
Commission of the European Communities (Continental Can),6
the Court held that eliminating competition by acquiring a competing firm was an abuse.
Subsequent Court decisions found abuse in a variety of conduct, including both the exploitation of the dominant firm's monopoly power and the elimination, or discipline, of its competitors.7 Pricing cases have occurred within both categories of

conduct. Echoing the examples of abuse under article 86, which
include charging or paying unfair or discriminatory prices, the
cases have involved monopoly pricing and price discrimination.
The price discrimination cases provide examples of monopolistic
exploitation and anticompetitive pricing behavior. Furthermore,
the Commission recently considered its first case involving predatory pricing, the most hotly debated pricing issue under section 2
of the Sherman Act. The Commission held, in an interim order,
4. Treaty of Rome, art. 86, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
5. Adams, Antitrust Constraints on Single-Firm Refusals to Deal by Monopolists in the European Economic Community and the United States, 20
TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 4-6 (1985).
6. 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 242-45, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 199, 222-25
(1973).
7.

C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 11 7-57 to

-76 (2d ed. 1978). Bellamy and Child categorized the article 86 abuses as exploitative or anticompetitive. Id. 7-51.
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that predatory pricing is a violation of article 86.8 Thus, for the
first time, sufficient material exists to allow a comprehensive comparison of the antitrust treatment of single-firm pricing practices
under both systems.

II.

UNFAIR PRICING: EXPLOITATION AND PREDATION

In the early article 86 cases, the Court of Justice gave doctrinal
hints on which pricing practices would constitute abuses. In
Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel,9 the Court held that pricing a patented product higher than a similar, nonpatented product did not
necessarily constitute an abuse.1" The Court's decision, however,
implied that in some circumstances, a higher price could be abusive. In Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l.,"1 the Court applied the Parke,
Davis standards to trademarked products and concluded that "although the price level of the product may not of itself necessarily
suffice to disclose such an abuse, it may, however, if unjustified
by any objective criteria, and if it is particularly high, be a determining factor.' 1 2 This concept of objective justification became a
central element in the analysis of abusively high prices. The third
case in which the Court of Justice addressed pricing practices was
Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro-SB-Grossmdrkte. 3 Metro imported Deutsche Grammophon records into West Germany from
France and sold them at prices much lower than those charged
under Deutsche Grammophon's resale price maintenance agreements. Deutsche Grammophon sued Metro in the West German
courts, seeking to enjoin the discount sales. On Metro's claim that
Deutsche Grammophon's pricing practices violated article 86, the
West German court referred the case to the Court of Justice,
which again ruled that the price difference alone did not necessarily justify a finding of abuse, although a "particularly marked"
difference might be abusive, "if unjustified by any objective criteria.' 1 4 In each of these cases, the Court determined whether the

8. Engineering and Chem. Supplies (Epsom and Gloucester) Ltd. v. AKZO
Chemie UK Ltd., 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 13 (1983), 38 Common Mkt.

L.R. 694 (1983).
9.

1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 55, 7 Common Mkt. L.R. 47 (1968).

10. Id. at 72, 7 Common Mkt. L.R. at 60.
11.
12.
13.
14.

1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 69, 10 Common Mkt. L.R. 260 (1971).
Id. at 84, 10 Common Mkt. L.R. at 275 (emphasis added).
1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, 10 Common Mkt. L.R. 631 (1971).
Id. at 501, 10 Common Mkt. L.R. at 658-59.
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price represented an abusive exploitation by comparing it with
the price charged by a nondominant firm for a similar product. If
the difference was too great, the dominant firm was required to
objectively justify its price. The Court did not require that costs
or profit margins be analyzed in determining whether the price
charged was excessive. Costs and profit margins could enter the
calculations only as part of the justification attempted by the
dominant firm.
A.

General Motors Continental

The first case in which the Commission asserted an unfair price
violation under article 86 was brought against General Motors
Continental (GM), a General Motors subsidiary that manufactured and distributed vehicles in Europe. 15 Belgian law required
that all automobiles licensed in Belgium be certified to comply
with safety standards. This certification was obtained through a
two-step process. First, the manufacturer or importer requested
approval of each automobile model. After granting this approval,
the Belgian authorities required the manufacturer to certify that
each automobile conformed to the model's specifications and to
affix a sticker to each automobile showing that it had been certified. Only then could the owner register the automobile and drive
it on public roads.1 6
The certification process worked routinely for automobiles imported into Belgium by manufacturers and sold through regular
distribution networks. Problems, however, arose in obtaining certificates of conformity and stickers for automobiles imported by
consumers or imported through irregular channels. Before March
1973, automobiles that were not imported by manufacturers were
inspected at government testing stations which provided the required certificates and stickers. In March 1973, however, the Belgian Government proclaimed that government stations would
only inspect used cars that had been registered abroad for at least
six months; newer automobiles had to be certified by the manu-

15.

General Motors Continental N.V. v. Commission of the European Com-

munities, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1367, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. 95 (1976); In
re General Motors Continental N.V., 18 O.J. Eup. COMM. (No. L 29) 14 (1975), 15
Common Mkt. L.R. D20 (1975).
16. General Motors, 18 O.J. EUR.
L.R. at D21-22.

COMM.

(No. L 29) at 14, 15 Common Mkt.
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facturer or its Belgian agent. 17
GM, for the first time, received individual requests to inspect
and certify the Opel automobiles that it manufactured in Europe.
GM's only previous experience with occasional, irregular inspec-'
tions of General Motors cars was the inspection of American
models imported into Belgium. GM's response to this sudden imposition of the requirement that it perform this service for its European as well as its American cars was to charge the same price
for both, 5,000 Belgian francs (BF) or 100 United States dollars
($).18 At the same time, GM began studying the cost of occasional
inspection and certification of the European cars and reviewing
the cost of inspection and certification of the American ones. GM
realized that the average total cost per automobile would be substantially less for European cars because the sizeable costs of obtaining approval for the model would be spread over the much
larger number of cars of each European model, including both
cars imported and sold through the regular dealer network and
those that arrived through parallel imports. 19 Following the completion of its cost study approximately four months later, GM
adopted a differentiated price schedule based upon its average
costs of certifying European and American automobiles. Under
the new price schedule, GM charged 1,250 BF to inspect European cars and 5,300 to 7,000 BF for American ones.2 0 Also, GM
refunded the difference between the old and new charges to the
owners of the five Opels that had been inspected and certified
under the old price schedule.2 1
The Commission then initiated proceedings to fine GM for the
original abusive pricing structure, apparently out of concern that
such a pricing structure could be used to hinder parallel imports
and thus to maintain the segregation of national markets. The
Commission, focusing on the 5,000 BF price, made no attempt to
determine GM's costs and profits. Instead, the analysis compared
GM's inspection charges for the Opels with its charges for American automobiles and with Belgian companies' charges for other
makes of automobiles. Although these comparisons were the primary basis for the Commission's finding that the 5,000 BF price

17. Id. at
18. Id. at
19. Id. at
20. Id. at
21. Id. at

15, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D22.
15, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D23.
16, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D25.

15, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D23.
15, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D24.
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was excessive, the Commission indicated that it also relied upon
the facts that the government inspection stations had charged
1,140 BF and that GM had made certain Opel inspections free of
charge.2 2 Finally, the Commission treated GM's new price schedule as an admission that its earlier charges for European
automobiles had been unreasonable. The Commission fined GM
5,000,000 BF ($100,000).2s

The comparison between the price charged for inspecting
American automobiles and that for inspecting European models
showed that GM had engaged in price discrimination, in a true
economic sense, by charging the same price for services with different costs. 24 Nowhere in its decision, however, did the Commis-

sion indicate that it regarded this as price discrimination in a legal sense. 25 The Commission, instead, used the disparity in costs
to demonstrate that the price charged was excessive because it
did not bear a reasonable relationship to the cost of inspecting
and certifying the Opels. Because the total cost of certifying an
Opel was much less than the total cost of certifying an American
automobile, the prices charged to the Opel owners should have
been lower. The Commission assumed that 5,000 BF was a reasonable price for inspecting and certifying an American automobile,28 and therefore concluded that this was an unreasonable
price for the inspection of an Opel. A further comparison by the
Commission supported its conclusion that the Opel inspection
price was excessive: no other manufacturer charged more than
2,500 BF for inspecting its European automobiles independently
27
imported into Belgium.

22.

Id. at 16, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D25-26.

23. Id. at 19, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D30.
24. See F. SCHEER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
315 (2d ed. 1980).

STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-

FORMANCE

25. Where the Commission indicated that this case could be characterized as
illegal price discrimination under article 86(c), it was discussing the difference
between the price charged for inspecting Opels sold by GM dealers in Belgium
and that charged for inspecting the five Opels imported into Belgium outside
these channels. General Motors, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. at 17, 15 Common Mkt.
L.R. at D26. The Commission concluded that the charges made for cars sold by
GM dealers were not "particularly excessive" in relation to the purchase price.
Id. at 14, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D22. This strange measure of comparison
appears in no other EEC case. It should not be taken as a serious test of excessive pricing, because even the 5,000 BF price would pass it.

26. Id. at 17, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D27.
27.

This comparison is meaningful only if one assumes that the costs in-
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The Commission apparently concluded from these comparisons
that GM had charged an excessive, abusive price, but the Commission decision was unclear about whether charging excessive
prices, by itself, was abusive or whether aggravating factors were
also required to make it so. Introducing its discussion of abusive
pricing with the statement that "[tihe fact that the charging of
excessive prices was abusive is shown by a number of circumstances, 28 the Commission implied that other factors contributed
to its finding that the excessive price was abusive. However, the
discussion following this statement establishes the excessiveness
itself, although the Commission's conclusion again emphasizes the
abusiveness: "The above circumstances demonstrate that, as is
evidenced by the extraordinary disparity between actual costs incurred and prices actually charged . . ., General Motors Continental abused its dominant position ... and applied unfair
prices within the meaning of [article 86(a)]. ' 9 Although its later
characterization of 5,000 BF as an inspection charge that was "excessive and amounted to an abuse" 30 does not clarify the Commission's analysis, its finding of abuse in charging "substantiallyexcessive prices ' 31 may provide the clearest hint of the
Commission's thinking. The "extraordinary disparity" between
cost and price probably makes the price "unfair" and, thereby,
abusive; it is possible, however, that the Commission considers all
excessive prices abusive.
The Commission approved GM's subsequent price schedule,
which was based upon the different average total costs of certifying European and American models, and which imposed "a much
lower price for inspecting European passenger vehicles than for
American passenger vehicles. ' 32 In spite of this voluntary termination of the abuse,3 3 the Commission fined GM, and the company appealed to the Court of Justice.

volved and the worth of the services provided were roughly equivalent. This assumption about the costs may be correct, particularly in light of the 100% price
differential, but does not appear to have been made, even implicitly, by the
Commission.

28. General Motors, 18 O.J. Eum. CoMM. (No. L 29) at 16, 15 Common Mkt.
L.R. at D25.
29. Id. at 16, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D26.
30. Id. at 17, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D27.
31. Id. at 16, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D24 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 18, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D29.

33. Id. at at 18-19, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D29-30.

19851

ANTITRUST REGULATION

The Court's Advocate General viewed GM's price reduction as
an admission that the earlier price was abusive.3 4 In doing so, he
proposed an incorrect interpretation of the facts and an improvident rule of law. Although GM's reduction may have been an admission that the 5,000 BF price was too high, a fact that it does
not seem to have contested during the proceedings, it does not
follow that GM had admitted that the price was either unfair or
abusive. The effect of the Advocate General's legal approach
would have been to tend to freeze prices at the supracompetitive
level because of the adverse inference that lowering them would
create. Furthermore, his conclusion that charging an unfair price
is abusive, regardless of the presence of any anticompetitive purpose or effect,3 5 would further compound this tendency to freeze
prices.
Although the Court agreed that the price was excessive, it held
there had been no infringement of article 86 because GM acted
reasonably when it charged the excessive price and as soon as it
discovered that the price was too high it refunded the excess.3
Although the Court's opinion contains little analysis, it does further develop the doctrinal test for abusive pricing. The Court
stated that abuse could be found in "the imposition of a price
which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service
provided.

'3 7

Because there was no dispute that the 5,000 BF price

was excessive under the Court's test,38 GM would have been
guilty of violating article 86 unless it were excused by the circumstances under which the price was charged. The Court cautioned
that the issue of abuse "must be considered in light of all the
factors"3 9 and held that GM had given an adequate justification
34. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1386-87, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at 103-04
(Opinion of Advocate General).
35. Id.
36. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1380, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at 110. The
Commission had rejected this argument, holding that GM should have legally
bound itself at the time of charging the 5,000 BF to refund the excess once its
cost studies were completed and that the refund did not alter the prior abuse in
imposing the price. 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D28-29. Advocate General Mayras
rejected the Commission's finding that the abuse was intentional, and therefore
would have quashed the fine. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1388-90, 17 Common
Mkt. L.R. at 105-08 (Opinion of Advocate General).
37. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1379, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at 109.
38. Id. at 1379, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at 110.
39. Id. at 1379, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at 110.
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of its conduct.
In explaining why GM was excused, the Court pointed out that
the price had been quicdy brought "into line with the real economic cost. 4 0° The Court thus implied that the "economic value"

of a service or good is measured by its "real economic cost." Apparently, a dominant firm may only charge a price high enough to
cover its costs, including a reasonable profit. A price above that
level is excessive and, unless excused by the circumstances,
abusive.
In General Motors the price charged was clearly supracompetitive because it far exceeded GM's costs, by any method of measurement. Thus, the Court did not consider the appropriate measure of cost nor determine the availability of cost information.
The next unfair pricing case which the Court of Justice decided,
United Brands Co. v. Commission of the European Communities,41 required the Court to fully consider a dominant firm's pricing policy. United Brands demonstrated that cost data is difficult
to collect and interpret and that correctly deciding such cases can
be hard.
B.

United Brands

United Brands Company was the largest banana producing and
marketing firm in the Common Market and in the world. It also
led the banana industry in innovation and vertical integration,
operating an enterprise that extended from the plantation to the
ripening-distribution stage and that included the largest fleet of
refrigerated banana ships in the world. In the early 1960s United
Fruit Company, United Brands' predecessor, developed the CavendishNalery, a new variety of banana which was hardier and
more disease resistant. 42 United Brands introduced two significant changes that contributed to the Cavendish becoming the
most widely sold banana in the world. First, United Brands
packed its bananas in boxes at the plantation, enabling wholesalers to employ more scientific ripening procedures and produce
40. Id. at 1380, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at 110.
41. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978); Inre
United Brands Co., 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) 1 (1976), 17 Common Mkt.

L.R. D28.
42.

See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 312, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 438

(Opinion of Advocate General).
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more uniformly ripened bananas.4 3 Second, and more significant,
United Brands began to market its bananas under brand names."
brand name, but other
United Brands' "Chiquita" was the first
45
banana companies soon followed suit.
United Brands successfully used extensive advertising to cultivate public awareness of the brand name.46 Furthermore, the
careful selection of bananas to be branded as Chiquitas and the
rigorous oversight of the ripening and distribution process fostered an image of high quality. Because Chiquita bananas were
better than unbranded bananas and arguably better than the
brands of competitors, United Brands could charge thirty to forty
47
percent more for its Chiquitas than for its unbranded bananas
and could maintain a competitive price that averaged nearly 7.5
percent above the prices that other companies charged for their
brands.48
Although these price comparisons might have been enough to
cause the Commission to conclude that the Chiquita prices were
excessive and in violation of article 86, United Brands' practice of
charging different prices in different national markets probably
attracted the Commission's attention.4 9 The Commission not only
viewed this practice as price discrimination in violation of article
86(c), 50 but also used it as the primary means of showing that the
higher prices were excessive and in violation of article 86(a).
United Brands shipped its Chiquita bananas to two European
ports, Bremerhaven and Rotterdam, for delivery to distributors

43. Id. at 314, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 440.
44. Id. at 315, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 441.
45. Id. at 329, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 459.
46. Id. at 329, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 460.
47. 19 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 95) at 15-16, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D53.
48. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 301, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 502. The
premium was even greater at the wholesale and retail levels. Id. at 339, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 472 (Opinion of Advocate General).
49. In addition to the pricing abuses discussed in this Article, United Brands
had terminated one of its ripener/distributors to discipline it for participating in
an advertising campaign for a competing brand of banana. See Adams, Antitrust Constraintson Single-FirmRefusals to Deal by Monopolists in the European Economic Community and the United States, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 29-31
(1985). The terminated distributor filed a complaint with the Commission. However, this does not explain what attracted the Commission's attention to United
Brands' pricing policies.
50. This charge is analyzed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying
notes 120-54.

12
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who transported the bananas to their ripening facilities throughout the Common Market. The prices that United Brands charged
each distributor depended upon the country in which the distributor operated. Irish ripeners paid the least; Belgians and Danes
the most. The Belgians paid an average of eighty percent more
than the Irish distributors, while the Danes paid nearly two and
one-half times the Irish prices. 51 From a United Brands admission
that the Irish prices resulted in a small profit, the Commission
concluded that the profit on Continental European sales must
have been at least as great as the margin by which the Continental prices exceeded the Irish prices.2 Relying upon the Deutsche
Grammophon5 3 rule that large, unjustified price differences could
be a basis for finding abuse, the Commission held that United
Brands' Continental prices violated article 86.
By comparing the price differences between Chiquita bananas
and United Brands' unbranded bananas and between Chiquitas
and other companies' brands,55 the Commission sought to further
support both its conclusion that the Chiquita prices were abusive
and the necessary, but implicit, corollary that the prices significantly exceeded the economic value of the bananas. To the Commission the difference in quality between Chiquita bananas and
United Brands' unbranded bananas was insignificant. Considering
together the quality difference and United Brands' added cost of
advertising the Chiquita name, the Commission found that only
one-half of the price difference was objectively justified.5 6 The
Commission refused to consider the added costs of selecting,
branding, and ripening, which United Brands claimed were incurred to produce consistently higher quality Chiquita bananas.
Even more noteworthy is the Commission's substitution of its

51. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) at 9-10, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D44.
52. Id. at 15, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D52-53.
53. See supra text accompanying note 13.
54. 19 O.J. EUR. CoriM. (No. L 95) at 15, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D52-53.
55. Id. at 15-16, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D53.
56. The Commission's actual language is confusing: "At the very most, half
of this difference in price cannot be accounted for by differences in quality or
the costs of advertising campaigns." Id. at 16, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D53. It
is unlikely the Commission meant that half or less of the difference was unjustified. If it had, the case would have been deficient on its face, because there is no
basis for concluding that the prices significantly exceeded the economic value.
The Commission must have meant "[a]t the very most, half of this difference
[can] be accounted for . ..

."
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own valuation of the quality increment for that of the marketplace. Ripeners, retailers, and consumers valued the quality of the
Chiquita bananas more highly than did the Commission. 7 The
Commission's reliance upon its own subjective judgment, rather
than upon the business judgment of firms in the banana trade
and the preference of consumers in the market, vividly demonstrates the key difference between EEC and United States antitrust enforcement.
An extremely significant result of the Commission's decree is
the weakening of United Brands' rivals. Chiquita bananas were
the premium product on the market, reputed to be better than
any other brand of bananas. Their quality was more uniform and
more consistent than that of other bananas, and their prices fluctuated less. Chiquita bananas sold for an average premium of
7.4% over other brands. By ordering the 15% price reduction, the
Commission commanded that United Brands sell its premium
product, the most popular banana in Europe, for 7.6% less than
its competitors had charged for their brands. The competitors, already under United Brands' dominance, faced the dilemma of either lowering their prices to maintain their sales or losing market
share to United Brands, if they kept their prices above the new
Chiquita prices. One versed in American antitrust doctrine and
economics must be puzzled by an attempt to remedy the anticompetitive effects of a firm's dominance by weakening its rivals by
diminishing either their profits or their market shares.
In addition to its dubious effect, the Commission's remedy was
unworkable in two respects. First, the premiums between
Chiquita bananas and other brand name bananas were dictated
by consumer preferences. In order to maintain existing levels of
sales, competitors had to price their brands lower than the Chiquitas. Thus, had United Brands been forced to lower Chiquita
prices, its competitors would have been compelled by the market
to lower their prices by roughly the same 15% to maintain the
price differential. Once the banana market regained equilibrium,
57. See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 338-39, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 472
(Opinion of Advocate General). Indeed, many retailers based their strategy upon
Chiquitas because their uniformity and quality resulted in larger turnover and
smaller price fluctuations than could be obtained with other bananas. Id. at 33940, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 472.
58. The Commission held that a 15% reduction would end the abuse. 19 O.J.
EuR. COMM. (No. L 95) at 16, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D53. This would reduce
the premium range from 30-40% to 15-25%.

14
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United Brands would regain its 7.4% premium over other brands
and again face the potential of being in violation of article 86(a)
since the differential, rather than costs, was the basis used to determine the fairness of the Chiquita prices. Thus, the Commission's 15% reduction order that was intended to resolve United
Brands' uncertainty about whether its prices were legal, offered,
at best, only temporary comfort.
Second, although it disclaimed any intent to take over United
Brands' pricing responsibilities, the Commission required United
Brands to submit semiannual reports of its prices during the next
two years. 59 While continuing supervision may have been necessary to implement and enforce the price controls imposed on
United Brands, the Commission was naive in assuming that a
two-year period would be sufficient. The Commission's characterization of the two-year period as "sufficient to enable the Commission to satisfy itself that acceptable competitive conditions . ..
have been restored ' 6° is unwarranted. As demonstrated above,
the Commission's decree would likely have worsened competitive
conditions during the two-year period. Thus, supervision would
have been needed more, not less, at its end. 1
Furthermore, the efficacy of Commission supervision, even during the two-year period, is questionable. The Commission gave
United Brands explicit permission to change its prices to reflect
changes in costs.2 Having failed to investigate United Brands'
costs, the Commission would have encountered difficulty in verifying any claimed changes in them. Additionally, under the Commission's order, United Brands could justify higher prices with
increased promotional expenditures designed to increase product
59. See F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 232.
60. 19 O.J. EUR.COMM. (No. L 95) at 20, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D60.
61. If the case were seen as primarily concerning the segregation of geographical markets along national lines-the cardinal sin against Common Market competition law-the two-year period would be more defensible. With the

elimination of United Brands' ban on resale of bananas and its price discrimination, the Commission expected to break down commercial barriers restraining
trade between the different countries. Once this had been accomplished there
would have been less need to monitor United Brands' prices for discrimination,
especially since its distributors would have become accustomed to the uniform
prices and would have been likely to complain if they were discriminated against
again. However, both the phrasing and the location of the reporting requirement
indicate that it was ancillary to the ban on unfair, rather than discriminatory,

pricing.
62.

19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 95) at 19, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D58.
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differentiation, consumer preference, and United Brands'
dominance.
The Court of Justice reversed the Commission's finding that
United Brands' prices had been unfair and held that, although
the Commission's understanding of the law was correct, its methodology was not. Again, the opinion emphasized legal doctrine
but evidenced little comprehension of business practices and even
less understanding of economics. The Court found that the key
deficiency in the Commission's case was its reliance upon the
comparison between Continental European prices and Irish prices
to support its finding that Continental prices were unfair." By
the time the case reached the Court, United Brands had retracted
its admission that Irish Chiquita prices had been profitable, explaining that the admission had been made before the end of its
fiscal year and, therefore, without the benefit of year-end figures
which revealed that United Brands had sustained a loss in Ireland.6 4 The Advocate General did not find "this belated explanation very convincing" and, furthermore, supported the continued
use of the Irish prices as a point of reference even if they had
been unprofitable. 5 The Court of Justice, however, disagreed
with the Advocate General. Because the Commission had failed to
disprove United Brands' assertion that Irish Chiquita prices were
low introductory prices which were not designed to produce a
profit, the Court concluded that the Commission had not carried
its burden of proof to establish that the Continental prices were
unfair. 6 The Court also gave United Brands the benefit of the
doubt because Continental banana prices had remained constant,
in real terms, for nearly twenty years.67 Other comparisons relied
63. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 302-03, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 502.
64. Id. at 303, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503-04.
65. Advocate General Mayras noted that the losses were due to hurricanes in
Honduras and Guatemala. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 340, 21 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 473 (Opinion of Advocate General).
66. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 302-03, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503. The
Court held that the burden of proof had shifted to the Commission even though
United Brands had not supported its claim with any accounting statements or
reliable particulars. Id. at 303, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503-04.
67. Id. at 303, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 504. The Advocate General had rejected the argument because United Brands had pioneered improved techniques
that lowered its costs of obtaining bananas during that period. The Advocate
General seemed driven by his concern that producing and consuming countries
had not ratably shared the benefits of these advances. Id. at 338-39, 21 Common
Mkt. L.R. at 471-72 (Opinion of Advocate General).

16

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18.'1

upon by the Commission were insufficient to sustain the Commission's charges. By refusing to rely upon the Commission's comparison between United Brands' Chiquita prices and unbranded
banana prices, the Court implicitly rejected the Commission's reliance upon its assessment that the differences in quality were minuscule."' The Court also found the 7.4% difference between Chiquitas and other brand name bananas insufficient to create a
presumption that Chiquita prices were excessive. 9
In reversing the Commission's finding of a violation of article
86(a), the Court set out the unfair pricing test in more detail than
in General Motors. Yet, as in the previous case the Court defined
the violation as "charging a price which is excessive because it has
no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product. 70 In
United Brands, the "costs actually incurred" replaced "real economic cost" as the basis for comparing costs and price. This
change, however, is probably more semantic than substantive.
The first step in the unfair pricing test compares "the selling
price of the product in question and its cost of production" to
determine the dominant firm's profit margin. This margin "objectively" determines whether the price charged by the dominant
firm is excessive. 72 If so, it must next be determined whether the
excessive price was unfair either "in itself or when compared to
competing products. 713 Although the Court did not delineate
when an excessive price would be "unfair in itself," its treatment
of the 7.4% difference between the Chiquitas and other brand
name bananas may indicate that the extent to which prices are
excessive would be the principal focus of the analysis.
When the Commission's decision is viewed within the Court's
United Brands analytical framework, it is apparent that the
Commission skipped the first step of the unfair pricing test and

68. Certainly the Court would have concluded that an unjustified price differential of 20 to 40% established that the Chiquita prices were excessive. The
Court, therefore, must have concluded either that the differential was justified
and the Commission's assessment was wrong or that branded and unbranded
bananas were two different products and the Commission was wrong to compare
their prices.
69. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 303, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 504.
70. Id. at 301, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 502; cf. supra text accompanying
note 37 (outlining the test employed in General Motors).
71. See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 301, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 502-03.

72. Id.
73. Id.
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had an insufficient factual basis for its second-step comparison.
The Court's analysis of the case raises the intriguing question of
whether the first step is mandatory. Would the Commission's decision have been overturned if United Brands had not denied the
profitability of its Irish prices? Although the court determined
that United Brands' retraction undermined the Commission's basis for finding the Continental prices excessive, the Court had earlier chastised the Commission for failing "to require [United
Brands] to produce particulars of all the constituent elements of
its production costs,"7 4 clearly indicating the Court's preference
for an "objective" cost-based determination but recognizing that
potential complexities in ascertaining costs could require the use
of other methods.7 5 The Court concluded, however, that the banana market did not present insurmountable cost complexities
and that the Commission, had it investigated costs, could have
verified the figures supplied by United Brands.
The Court's rationale for using production costs in the first
step of its unfairness test demonstrated its disdain for economists
("economic theorists" who "think up" methods for determining
whether a price is unfair)78 and its failure to master the economic
concepts. Although the Court claimed to appreciate the difficulties in determining production costs, which in the Court's opinion
included "indirect costs and general expenditure, '7 7 the Court really failed to understand what was involved.78 Advocate General

74. Id. at 302, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
75. See id.
76. Id., see also Ashley, PredatoryPricing Under Article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome, 32 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1004, 1011 n.36 (1983) (commenting on this patronizing reference).
77. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 302, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
78. Not only did the Court say that production costs might include indirect
costs and general expenditures, but it also noted that important causes of variations in production costs include the firm's size, objectives, complexity, geographical range, number of products, number of subsidiaries, and the subsidiaries' relationships with each other. Id. at 302, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
Thus, the Court included fixed costs such as corporate administrative expenses
and other costs not directly involved in production and distribution of the physical product. Presumably, costs of research and development, the banana plantations, the packing plants, domestic and international transportation, marketing
research, advertising, and overhead of the European operation would be in-

cluded. The Court gives no hints on how these and other indirect costs are to be
apportioned. The only simplifying fact in the case is that most of these costs

need only be allocated between two products, branded and unbranded bananas,
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Mayras correctly pinpointed the problems associated with cost
analysis in the United Brands situation. These problems not only
included United Brands' vertical integration and world-wide operation, which made any attempt to allocate costs in an economically meaningful fashion extremely difficult, but also included the
effect of taxes and customs duties on transfer prices. 9 The Court
refused to acknowledge that these difficulties would hamper the
determination of United Brands' costs, but it implied that if the
determination were hindered, industry cost studies and industry
averages could be substituted for the actual costs of the dominant
firm.8 0 The Court, however, provided no guidance about when industry cost studies should be consvlted and no statement of the
costs to be included in either an industry-wide analysis or an
analysis of the dominant firm's costs. It is not even clear whether
the Court recognized the difference between economic costs and
those determined by the use of accounting conventions."'
The implications of the Court's suggestion that industry cost
averages could replace actual costs incurred by a dominant firm
are even more intriguing. A firm that has achieved a dominant
position is unlikely to be less efficient than its rivals, but rather,
probably will be more efficient. United Brands, for example, was
the largest, most completely integrated, and most innovative banana firm in the world. The factors, upon which the Commission
and the Court relied to show United Brands' dominance clearly
demonstrated that it was the most efficient firm in the industry.

although general corporate overhead would have to be allocated among United
Brands' many products. See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
512, 513b
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
(1978) (discussing the difficulty of proving costs and the unreliability of accounting figures for that purpose); 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW. AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 11712 (1978) (discussing alternative measures of cost); F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 268-74, (discussing the measurement and apportionment of costs and the discrepancies between
accounting and economic figures).
79. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 333-34, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 477-78
(Opinion of the Advocate General). An additional problem, at least in measuring
and allocating costs in future cases, is that firms may engage in adaptive behavior, setting transfer prices to minimize the likelihood of detection and conviction
of antitrust violations.
80. See id. at 302, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
81. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 272-74; 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 78, at %f512c, 513b (each distinguishing economic profit
from accounting profit).
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Thus, the use of industry averages, rather than a dominant firm's
own costs, overstates the firm's costs, understates its profit margin, and, therefore, increases the dominant firm's permissible
prices and related profits by the amount of its enhanced efficiency. Although the Court of Justice surely did not intend this
result under its excessive price test, the economic benefits counsel
its continuance, especially now that its effect has been explained.
Innovation that improves productive efficiency is a central goal of
any rational economic system. Both market and mixed systems
use competition to foster this goal. A firm that improves efficiency
through innovation should be rewarded, not penalized, for its success. Consequently, United Brands and other dominant firms
should be allowed to benefit from their superior efficiency by including the cost savings in their profits as these firms are able to
do in the United States.2
In the final analysis, what cost test the Court intended to adopt
remains uncertain. The Court's inclusion of indirect costs and
overhead indicates that the average total cost of the product is to
be used. Thus, the first step in the test would be to determine
whether the price markedly exceeded the average total cost. It is
unclear exactly how the Commission will determine costs. If the
Commission attempts to do so on its own, the results certainly
will be suspect because the Commission lacks the accounting and
economic sophistication to properly assess which costs should be
included in the analysis or to readily recognize dubious figures
that are supplied by the firm being investigated. In addition, the
accounting records of a dominant firm may be located outside the
geographical territory of the EEC and thus, may not be subject to
direct inspection by Commission officials. The dominant firm frequently will have the upper hand because it will control most of
the relevant cost information and because its own accounting and
economic experts may select and present that information to the
firm's advantage. This latter difficulty is compounded by the
firm's ability to make unsupported assertions about its costs or
profits and, thereby, put the burden on the Commission to disprove them.83 Because the best that one reasonably can expect of
the Commission is crude measurement of cost using a variety of
methods to produce corroborating results,

4

the first step in the

82. See F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 280-82.
83. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
84. See V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC

COMPETITION LAW AND
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Court's test, comparing costs to prices to determine whether the
profit margin is excessive, gradually may be discarded or, at least,
made optional. In the meanwhile, the decision in the next case
may be controlled by whether the Court accepts the Commission's rough calculation of costs."5
C.

Unfairly Low Prices

The exact relationship between cost and price that will result in
prices being declared "unfair" is not clear. Because the Court in
United Brands was concerned with excessive prices, it emphasized excessive profits. The unfairness that resulted was to the
purchasers who paid more than they should have.8 6 Might unduly
low, predatory prices be outlawed under the unfairness test of article 86(a), as monopoly pricing is? Is limit pricing forbidden,
too?
As a practical matter, the answers probably differ even though
the principles appear to apply to both limit and predatory pricing.8 7 While predatory pricing will be prohibited, limit pricing is
unlikely to be.
1.

Limit Pricing

In doctrinally assessing limit pricing, the focus of the Court's
test could be shifted from the unfairness to customers who paid
the excessive price to the unfairness to purchasers generally. This
general unfairness to purchasers results from the ability of a successful limit pricing scheme to continually distort the competitive
system." Limit pricing, however, probably will not be attacked
PRACTICE 124-25 (2d ed. 1981).
85. A common pattern that has emerged in EEC cases is for the Court of
Justice to approve the Commission's interpretation of article 86 but to reject the

Commission's methodology and factual proof. See, e.g., supra notes 63-69 and
accompanying text.

86. The Court referred to the price as one that was "unfair in itself." 1978 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 301, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
87. In a sense, limit pricing is permanent predatory pricing. See F. SCHERER,
supra note 24, at 538-39; Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A
Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 880-81, 888-89 (1976); Yamey, Predatory Price
Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & ECON. 129, 132-33 (1972).
88. Moreover, this would run afoul of article 86 as the Court has interpreted
it to implement article 3(f)'s goal of assuring that "competition in the common

market is not distorted." See Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 243-45, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 199, 223-25 (1973). See
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under article 86 because it produces no direct victims. The Commission brings cases against dominant firms after a victim of the
alleged abuse has filed a complaint.8 9 The Commission, instead of
actively seeking violations, usually reacts to situations that come
to its attention.90 Neither general purchasers nor potential entrants have sufficient reason or information either to report limit
pricing to the Commission or to file a complaint. Thus, a challenge to limit pricing is no more likely to be made in Europe than
it is in the United States, where concern is found only in academic writing.91
2. PredatoryPricing
In contrast to limit pricing, temporary predatory pricing has
been the subject not only of intense academic interest 92 but also
also Adams, supra note 5, at 4-6. Additionally, limit pricing could be forbidden
under article 86(b) which declares abusive "limiting production, markets or
technical development to the prejudice of consumers."
89. This was true, for example, in Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano v. Commission (Commercial Solvents), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, [1974] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 309; United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
207, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429; Benzine en Petroleum Handelmaatschappij
v. Commission (British Petroleum), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1513, [1978] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 174; Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1869, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 345; Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV v. Commission, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3461, 42 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 282 (1983); and Engineering and Chemical Supplies Ltd. v. AKZO
Chemie Ltd., 26 J. Eur. Comm. (No. L252) 13 (1983), 78 Common Mkt. L.R. 694
(1983).
90. In European Economic Community v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 19 O.J. EUR.
CoMM. (No. L 223) 27 (1976), 18 Common Mkt. L.R. D25, D26 (1976), which the
Commission claims to have initiated itself, a former employee of the defendant
had provided incriminating company documents to the Commission before it
commenced proceedings. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 598-99, 26 Common Mkt. L.R.
211, 261 (1979) (Opinion of Advocate General).
91. See, e.g., 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 78, at I 714b; F. SCHERER,

supra note 24, at 232-52; L. SULLIVAN,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 11821 (1977). But see Note, Telex v. IBM: Monopoly Pricing Under Section 2 of

the Sherman Act, 84 YALE L.J. 558 (1975).
92. The debate began with Phillip E. Areeda and Donald F. Turner's article,
Predatory Pricingand Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
88 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Areeda & Turner, Predatory
Pricing]. In that article, Areeda and Turner proposed that the conclusive test
for predatory pricing should be whether the price was above the seller's reasonably anticipated short-run marginal cost (or its surrogate, average variable cost).
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of numerous cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 In 1983
the Commission heard the first predatory pricing case in the
Common Market, Engineering and Chemical Supplies Ltd. v.
AKZO Chemie Ltd.94 As expected, the Commission ruled that
predatory pricing can be unfair under article 86(a).9 5 The United

Prices above this level would be conclusively presumed legal; those below, predatory. Id. at 733. F.M. Scherer quickly challenged Areeda and Turner in
Scherer, PredatoryPricingand the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV.
869 (1976), with Oliver E. Williamson's critique not far behind. Williamson,
Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
Many others joined the fray. The debate is summarized in Hurwitz and Kovacic,
Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REV. 63
(1982); Brodly & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and
the Evolution of Legal Standards,66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981); and Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHL L. REV. 263
(1981). When the dust settled, there was no clear winner, although even Areeda
and Turner agreed that their initial test was too simple and its conclusive presumption too rigid. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 78 at 11 711, 712,
715 (1978) and 1 711.2, 714.1-.2 (1982 Supp.).
93. Initial judicial reaction to Areeda and Turner's article was quick, albeit
qualified, acceptance. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); Hanson v.
Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977);
International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). But courts soon voiced second thoughts.
See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Chillicothe Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980); Pacific Engineering & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 802 (1977). As the academic debate heated up, the courts grew far more
cautious. Calvani and Lynch, Predatory Pricing Under the Robinson-Patman
and Sherman Acts: An Introduction, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 395-96 (1982).
United States courts generally now view cost-based tests as one of the most informative tools for determining whether prices are predatory, but not the sine
qua non originally proposed by Areeda and Turner. Monroe & Hill, The Predatory Pricing Controversy:Academic Theories Enter the Courtroom, 13 U. TOL.
L. REV. 539, 543 (1982). See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 125-30 (2d ed. 1984). In the final analysis, courts are seeking evidence of
predatory intent, and inferring it from below-cost pricing is just one of the

means of inquiry.
94. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 13, 78 Common Mkt. L.R. 694 (1983)
(interim order).

95. Commentators, including Commission officials, have repeatedly stated
that predatory pricing can be condemned as unfair under article 86(a). E.g., 2 H.
SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE E.E.C. TREATY 1 86.16 (1976); Temple Lang, Some Aspects of
Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Community Antitrust Law, 3 FORD-
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Brands test, which outlaws prices that are unfair "when compared to competing products," supports the Commission's
conclusion. 6
AKZO Chemie, a large Dutch chemical company with operations throughout the Common Market, produced and sold a wide
range of chemicals, including organic peroxides used in the milling of flour and the manufacturing of plastics. AKZO, the leading
producer of organic peroxides in the EEC, had a market share of
approximately forty-eight percent. Its share of the United Kingdom (U.K.) market for benzoyl peroxide, which was used in the
milling of flour, was fifty-two percent. AKZO's largest competitor
in the U.K. benzoyl peroxide market was Engineering and Chemical Supplies Ltd. (ECS), which had a thirty-five percent share of
the market. A third producer, with close9 7 commercial ties to
AKZO, sold the remaining thirteen percent.
When ECS began selling organic peroxides to the plastics industry, a market that AKZO historically had dominated, AKZO
threatened to sell peroxides to ECS' U.K. milling customers at
prices below cost, unless ECS withdrew from the plastics industry, particularly in Germany. ECS refused to withdraw, and
AKZO implemented its plan of predation, despite an injunction
issued by the High Court of Justice in London prohibiting it from
doing so.9s In issuing an interim restraining order, the Commission relied on three elements of proof of predatory pricing. First,
unambiguous "smoking pistol" internal memoranda of high-level
AKZO executives demonstrated that the price cuts were designed
to discipline, if not destroy, ECS in response to its expansion into
the plastics industry. The memoranda outlined a plan explicitly
HAM INT'L L.F.

1, 37 (1979-80); U. ToEPKE, EEC

COMPETITION LAW:

BusussS IS-

536, 570, 573
(1982); see also Commission of the European Communities, Memorandum on
Concentration (1966). Dr. Toepke would not categorize predatory pricing as
SUES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST CASES

"unfair" under article 86(a), but would leave it to be condemned under the article 86's general prohibition of abuse of a dominant position. His view seems
analytically unsupportable and has not been followed by the Commission, although this is not a question of practical import, but rather an issue of fascination, principally to the Continental legal mind.
96. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 301, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
97. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) at 14-15, 38 Common Mkt. L.R. at
697-98.
98. Id. at 14, 38 Common Mkt. L.R. at 696. Technically, the prohibition was
part of a settlement before the High Court, but it had the force of an injunction.
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involving below-cost pricing that was carefully targeted against
ECS through offers to its major customers. The memoranda also
corroborated ECS's claim of an AKZO ultimatum. Second,
AKZO's price reductions, were temporally selective, geographically restricted, and directed against a specific competitor unable
to withstand prolonged predatory pricing. Third, the prices were
significantly below cost. 9
The Commission made its doctrinal views clear when it defined
predatory pricing as pricing "at excessively low levels." It concluded that predatory pricing violates the article 86(a) prohibition against unfair pricing when used to drive a competitor out of
business or to force a competitor to sell out to the dominant
10 0
firm.
Below-cost prices may be justified if they are offered to meet
competition. AKZO raised this defense, but the Commission concluded that the internal memoranda of AKZO refuted the claim
that its price cuts were simply legitimate responses to competition.10 1 The Commission also rejected the "meeting competition"
defense because AKZO did not assert that all of its low-price offers were made in response to ECS's prices. Because the Commission based its rejection of the meeting competition defense on
factual rather than legal grounds, the defense would appear to be
available within the Common Market under a different set of
0 2
facts.1
Two sharp contrasts can be seen between the Commission's
AKZO decision and recent United States predatory pricing cases.
The first difference, the Commission's lack of concern for the
proper economic measure of cost, may result from the facts of the
case. AKZO, for example, admitted that its prices were significantly below its costs. 0 3 Perhaps AKZO's prices were so low that
the choice of a cost measure was immaterial. Certainly, the failure
to discuss costs did not result from a lack of information. The
Commission had obtained detailed information about AKZO's

99. Id. at 18, 38 Common Mkt. L.R. at 703.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. This conclusion is buttressed by the Commission's allowing AKZO to

charge a price below those fixed in the interim order "if it is necessary in good
faith to do so to meet (but not to undercut) a lower price shown to be offered by

another supplier ready and able to supply the same product to that [customer]."
Id. at 20, 38 Common Mkt. L.R. at 707.
103. Id. at 19-20, 38 Common Mkt. L.R. at 704.
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costs, prices, and profits. AKZO had provided the Commission
with production costs, 10 4 and Commission officials had conducted

surprise raids at AKZO's U.K. and Dutch headquarters, during
which they inspected and copied files and records that were relevant to the investigation. 10 5 The Commission apparently measured costs by accounting, rather than economic, standards, but
the decision does not indicate the Commission's rationale for its
choice of standards. Nor does the decision indicate whether the
Commission recognized that there was a choice to be made and
that different results might flow from the use of different cost
measures. The only clue to the Commission's thinking is found in
its discussion of the interim order, where the Commission indicated that it had separated production costs from transportation
costs and had not included profit as an element of cost, although
it recognized that profit must be included in the price. 00 The
Commission's treatment of costs as excluding normal profits, although different from that accorded by economists, conforms to
both general accounting practices and the scholarly analysis of article 86 by John Temple Lang, one of the Commission's antitrust
lawyers.10 7 Although the failure to label normal profits as costs
does not affect the outcome if normal profits are included separately in the calculations, it is significant to show that the Commission did not use economic definitions of costs.
Temple Lang has proposed that exclusionary prices at or near
cost be considered unfair and, therefore, in violation of article
86(a). 10 8 While this proposal initially may appear radical to antitrust lawyers who are familiar with the recent academic debate
and United States cases, nonetheless, this proposal is similar to
the accepted test in the United States prior to 1975.109 Interest-

ingly, Temple Lang contends that "[e]ven prices slightly above
104. Id. at 19, 38 Common Mkt. L.R. at 705.
105. Id. at 14, 38 Common Mkt. L.R. at 696. Because AKZO's corporate

headquarters were located in the EEC, the Commission could gather its own
information rather than merely rely upon that furnished by the defendant, as
was necessary in United Brands.
106. The Commission also indicated that a contribution to overhead could
properly be counted as a production cost. Id. at 19-20, 28 Common Mkt. L.R. at
705, following the Court's pronouncement in United Brands, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. at 302, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503.
107. See Temple Lang, supra note 95, at 37.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Yamey, supra note 87.
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cost, but below any normally acceptable rate of return, at least if
they are charged locally or temporarily, may have exclusionary effects. This is so especially if low prices are charged differentially
to discourage potential entrants, or to punish and exclude actual
entrants."' 110 This is the crux of the predatory pricing debate and
the central difference between Areeda and Turner's short-run
marginal cost test" and the Commission's approach. Neither
Temple Lang nor the Commission has given any indication that
short-run marginal cost or average variable cost are standards for
predatory pricing under article 86.112
The second major contrast between the EEC's AKZO decision
and recent predatory pricing cases in the United States is the
Commission's willingness to engage in detailed price regulation,
its claims to the contrary notwithstanding. The Commission not
only specified the appropriate method to calculate minimum
prices but also attached an annex to its opinion listing the minimum prices that it would allow AKZO to offer or charge each of
its customers for each product. 1 3 Although the interim order set
prices only for a limited period, the Commission's willingness to
engage in a high level of specificity has been established and can
be expected to influence any final order that the Commission issues in AKZO and future cases.
Predatory pricing appears destined to face harsher treatment in
the EEC than it has recently in the United States. Accounting
costs usually are skewed upward by the desire to minimize taxes
and, therefore, are likely to exceed economic costs.1 1 4 Full eco-

110. Temple Lang, supra note 95, at 37; cf. Yamey, supra note 87.
111. See, Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricing,supra note 92, at 697.
112. But see Toepke, Pricingof Products in the EEC, 16 INT'L LAW. 233, 236
n.6 (1982) (arguing for the use under article 86 of the Areeda & Turner shortrun marginal cost/average variable cost test). However, the force of Toepke's
argument is weakened by his inconsistency. He not only agrees with Temple

Lang's assessment that article 86 forbids exclusionary prices above cost but insufficient to produce a normal return, id. at 257-58 n.74, but also opines that
"Areeda and Turner ... have demonstrated that the only meaningful and
practical way to prove predation is to focus on cost [sic] below marginal or
average variable cost." Id. at 236 n.6 (emphasis added). Apparently since Temple Lang did not use the label "predatory pricing", Toepke did not notice that
Temple Lang and Areeda and Turner were analyzing the same problem.
113. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) at 19-21, 38 Common Mkt. L.R. at 705-

06, 708.
114. Accelerated depreciation methods and LIFO inventory accounting are
two of the more obvious ways in which costs are increased. See S. SIEGEL & D.
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nomic cost usually will exceed the Areeda and Turner test's
115
short-run marginal cost or its surrogate, average variable cost.

Thus, more prices will be declared predatory in the Common
Market than under the Areeda and Turner test or its modifications. 116 Because EEC competition law is complaint driven and
because there is no shortage of victims willing to complain of allegedly predatory pricing by a powerful competitor, it is foreseeable that additional predatory pricing cases will reach the Commission.11 7 Under the Commission's standards, defendants will
have difficulty in proving that low prices are not predatorily unfair under article 86(a), even absent the "smoking pistol" memoranda of AKZO Chemie.
In summary, a dominant firm operating in the Common Market
faces possible attack on its pricing policy from two directions.
The Commission may consider prices that are too high unfair to
customers and, therefore, prohibited. Alternatively, the Commission may consider prices that are too low unfair to competitors
and distortive of the competitive system, and, therefore, also prohibited. Noting the uncertainties may provide little help, but two
observations may provide some insight. First, a dominant firm
should not take any action which may be construed as dividing
the market along national lines or as fostering such divisions. The
Commission's attacks on the pricing policies of General Motors

3738, 43-45, 59-60 (1983); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 78, 512c. Historic cost accounting may tend to offset this, especially in times of rapid inflation. Because accounting costs do not include the cost of capital, it is necessary
to include a reasonable return or profit. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 78, %1508, 512b.
115. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 78, 715. This is true unless
the monopolist is producing at a level above its most efficient output, a situation
not likely to encourage predation. Areeda and Turner make an exception in this
rare case and measure predation by the higher average total cost. Probably the
same result would occur in the Common Market, since accounting costs generally will then also be below marginal cost.
116. The principal variation of the Areeda and Turner test gaining judicial
acceptance is a hybrid per se/rule of reason approach. It conclusively presumes
prices at or above average total cost to be legal, rebuttably presumes prices below short-run marginal (or average variable) cost to be illegal, and analyzes
under various rule of reason standards those prices below average total cost and
above or equal to short-run marginal cost. Huritz & Kovacic, supra note 92, at
100-10, 150.
117. But see Toepke, supra note 112, at 235-36.
SIEGEL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE: A GUIDE TO BASIC CONCEPTS
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and United Brands is directly attributable to this kind of market
division. In addition, AKZO Chemie also attempted to prevent a
British firm from invading its German market and, if successful,
would have isolated one market from the competition originating
in another. Second, price discrimination makes a pricing case
much easier for the Commission to win, if not on the article 86(a)
unfair pricing charge, then at least on article 86(c) discrimination.
Although the Commission has never won an unfair pricing case on
appeal to the Court of Justice, it has never lost a price discrimination decision. Thus, a dominant firm that discriminates on the
basis of nationality or national location is doubly damned.
III. DIFFERENTIAL PRICING: ARTICLE 86(c)
A.

Exploitation

Price discrimination, one of the examples of abuse that is given
by article 86, has been one of the principal objects of Commission
scrutiny. Article 86(c) forbids "applying dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at.a competitive disadvantage."'1 " The language of this
example would enable EEC authorities to focus upon true price
discrimination and to avoid many of the problems of the Robinson-Patman Act."' Unfortunately, this potential remains unrealized because the Commission and the Court of Justice have been
deciding these cases without sufficient understanding of or concern for the economic and business consequences.
The decided cases have addressed three types of differential
pricing: 1) profit enhancing, 2) customer tying, and 3) predatory.
The first type is exploitative and, thus, is important in a legal
system that seeks to regulate the exploitation of economic power
by dominant firms. The second and third types are anticompetitive abuses. Several significant differences arise from this analytical categorization, as will be seen later in this study.

118.

Treaty of Rome, art. 86, supra note 1.

119. 15

U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982). Article 86(c), however, does share the

Robinson-Patman Act limitation of applying only to discriminatory differential
pricing and not to discriminatorily charging the same price in transactions having different costs. This limitation is probably inherent in any legal proscription
of price discrimination.
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1.

United Brands

United Brands is the principal EEC case on exploitative price
differentiation. 120 Analysis of this charge and its relationship to
the unfair pricing charge is instructive.
United Brands' price differentials between the Irish and Continental markets were the basis for both charges.1 21 The Commis-

sion found the prices charged on the Continent by United Brand
to be unfair because they significantly exceeded those charged in
Ireland. The Court rejected this finding on the grounds that (1)
the Commission should have based its determination upon cost
studies which established United Brands' profit margin and (2)
the Commission had not proven that the Irish prices were profitable. 122 The Court, however, did accept the Commission's conclusion that United Brands had3 violated article 86(c) by engaging in
2
illegal price discrimination.1

Article 86(c) establishes three elements of a violation: (1) different prices, (2) applied to equivalent transactions, and (3) placing
trading parties at a competitive disadvantage. In United Brands
there was no doubt that the firm charged different prices, although the extent of the differences was in dispute. Three types
of price differences were present. First, United Brands charged
approximately 30 to 40 percent more for its Chiquita bananas
than for unbranded bananas of lower quality. 124 Although the

Commission considered this difference significant in concluding
that the Chiquita prices charged Continental customers were unfairly high and abusive under article 86(a), it did not attempt to
base the price discrimination violation of article 86(c) upon this
difference in price. Second, United Brands changed its prices
from week to week. The Commission did not attempt to base the
price discrimination case upon this difference either. 2 5 Instead,
120. Although the Commission in General Motors expressed some concern
that the excessive price charged to inspect imported Opels constituted price discrimination that harmed dealers who imported GM cars outside of the normal
channels, the decision was not based upon this effect nor did it rely upon article
86(c). 15 Common Mkt. L. R. at D26.
121. For the facts of United Brands, see supra text accompanying notes 4254.
122. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 303, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 503-04.
123. Id. at 299, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 501.
124. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) at 15-16, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D53.
125. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 336, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 468 (Opinion of Advocate General).
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the Commission focused exclusively on the third difference, the
disparity in Chiquita prices in different countries. According to
the Commission, the prices United Brands charged to its German
distributors from 1971 to 1974 averaged between 11.3 percent and
17.6 percent lower than those it charged its distributors in
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.1 26 The highest
weekly difference was 54 percent. 127 Similar differences existed
128
between Danish ripeners and ripeners in the Benelux countries,
with even greater differences calculated when the Irish market
was included, for United Brands' prices were lowest there.1 29 Al-

though United Brands claimed the differential was lower, averaging only 5 percent in 1975,130 nonetheless, United Brands clearly
was charging significantly different prices to its different customers, depending on the country in which their ripening facilities
were located and their distribution occurred. Thus, the first element was satisfied.
The Commission, without any difficulty, found the second element present, holding that the transactions involved had been
equivalent. This Commission finding is superficially appealing.
All United Brands' bananas that were destined for European
markets were imported through the ports of Rotterdam and
Bremerhaven. Furthermore, all Chiquita bananas that United
Brands imported into the European market were the same premium Cavendish variety, were grown in the same locations, and
were labelled with the same Chiquita brand.' 3 ' In addition, all
sales of Chiquitas to Continental ripeners were made on the same
contractual terms. 1 32 Thus, United Brands, through a single Euro-

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 295, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 498.
Id. at 295-96, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 498-99.
Id.
The Commission placed the average differential at 80% higher in

Belgium than Ireland. The greatest difference was in Denmark, where prices
were 138% higher than prices in Ireland for one week. Id. at 296, 21 Common
Mkt. L.R. at 499.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 294-95, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 498.
132. Although United Brands' Irish prices included the cost of delivery of
the bananas to Ireland (these sales were made c.i.f. Dublin. Id. at 299, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 501) while the Continental sales prices did not include transportation from the port (these bananas were sold f.o.r. the port,id.), this involves
no transactional significance; deducting the cost of freight and insurance yields a
comparable price. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) at 9-10, 17 Common Mkt. L.R.

at D44.
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pean subsidiary, sold the identical brand-name product to different buyers with delivery at the same time and at the same port.
The transactions seemed equivalent.
Whether the transactions actually were equivalent, however, is
doubtful. The bananas were destined for different markets. The
Commission had failed to establish a unified market for bananas
throughout the Community.133 Distinct national markets existed,
each with its own tariffs and market organizations. Undoubtedly,
United Brands faced different supply and demand curves in each
market, a fact that United Brands offered to justify its method of
pricing. Explaining its pricing mechanism, United Brands stated
that the week before each shipment of bananas was scheduled to
arrive in port, while it was on the high seas, United Brands discussed with its distributors the market conditions, including
wholesale prices, which it should expect for each local market
when the shipped bananas were ripe.134 United Brands then solicited orders and fixed the quantity offered to each distributor.
Four days before the bananas arrived, United Brands set the
price for each market and notified the ripeners, who were entitled
to cancel or reduce their orders. 35 United Brands alleged that the
goal of this system was to enable it to base the price to each distributor on the price the distributor could charge for the bananas
when he had ripened them. Because the distributors operated in
different markets, United Brands claimed that it had to treat
them differently.
Rather than analyze this as a question of equivalence of the
transactions, the Commission and Court viewed it as an issue of
"objective" justification for United Brands' conduct, holding that
the difference in retail prices in the various national markets did
not objectively justify the different prices charged to the distributors doing business in those countries. 136 In reaching their respective conclusions, the Court of Justice, and to a lesser extent the
Commission, enunciated remarkable economic views. The Court
133. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 275, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 485.
134. See id. at 296-97, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 499.
135. Id. at 298-99, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 499.
136. 19 O.J. EUR. COMMON (No. L 95) at 18, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D58;
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 298, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 500; see Siragusa,
Application of Article 86: Tying Arrangements, Refusals to Deal, Discrimination and Other Cases of Abuse, in REGULATING THE BEHAVIOR OF MONOPOLIES
AND DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS IN COMMUNITY LAW 398, 427 (J. Van Damme ed.
1977).
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chastised United Brands for violating the law of supply and
demand:
The interplay of supply and demand should, owing to its nature,
only be applied to each stage where it is really manifest. The mechanisms of the market are adversely affected if the price is calculated by leaving out one stage of the market and taking into account the law of supply and demand as between -the vendor and
the ultimate consumer and not as between the vendor (UBC) and
3
the purchaser (the ripener/distributors).1 7
Apparently, the Court of Justice does not realize that the law of
supply and demand is descriptive, not prescriptive.1 38 More significantly, the Court demonstrated its lack of understanding of
the factors that affect demand and the methods by which a firm
must determine its demand curve. The Court unrealistically suggested that United Brands, by considering the wholesale demand
for the ripened bananas, adversely affected the "mechanisms of
the market."13 9 How else was United Brands to set its prices? By
definition, a dominant firm cannot merely match an established
market price; it must set its price. The Court and Commission
apparently would require that a dominant firm not consider the
position of its customers. The Commission held that the factors
which necessarily affect the resale prices charged by distributors
could never objectively justify United Brands' practice of charging the distributors different prices.14 0 A firm with a carefully developed distribution chain, similar to United Brands', has an interest in seeing that its distributors prosper. The Court, however,
would prohibit a dominant firm from considering this interest in
making its pricing decisions. It is difficult to understand why.
Considering the distributors' success is not evil; it serves the interests of the distributors, as well as the dominant firm, and,
therefore, represents a realistic attempt to assess the various market forces at work.
The Court justified its prohibition of United Brands' consideration of market conditions at the wholesale level by reasoning that
137. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 298, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 500.
138. The Advocate General responded to United Brands' explanation of its

price calculation, "[s]uch an argument is tantamount to a blunt acknowledgement that it has the power to dictate its own laws." Id. at 337, 21 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 46-9 (Opinion of Advocate General).

139. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 298, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 500.
140. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) at 14-15, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D52.
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the distributors alone bore the risks of that market. 141 Again the
Court was wrong. United Brands set its prices only subsequent to
shipment of the bananas. Except for the three day period immediately before the arrival of the bananas, United Brands bore all
risk of price fluctuations while the bananas were en route. If
United Brands had required distributors to place firm orders at a
set price prior to shipment from South America, United Brands
would have borne substantially less risk. Furthermore, under the
system it used, had it set its prices at levels that did not reflect
the expected wholesale prices for ripened bananas in the following week, United Brands might have found itself with unsold,
perishable bananas to unload and dispose of in Rotterdam and
Bremerhaven. 142 Thus, United Brands clearly was the major riskbearer.
United Brands' allocation of risks probably was more efficient
than an allocation which placed greater risk on the ripeners.

43

United Brands had better knowledge of the supply of bananas
and of world conditions than did its ripeners and probably had
better knowledge of the European market as a whole than did any
individual ripener. Additionally, United Brands had greater resources than its distributors, and, thus, its existence and profitability were not threatened by the risks of price fluctuations in
the European markets the way some of its ripeners might have
been. Consequently, United Brands probably was less averse to
risk than were many of its ripeners.'" All of these reasons indicate that the United Brands' allocation of risks was not only efficient but also beneficial to the ripeners. Because the Court failed
to perceive correctly where the risks lay, it did not consider the
benefits of the allocation. Even if it had, the Court probably
would not have allowed United Brands to consider market condi141. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 298, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 500.
142. See United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 245 F. Supp. 161, 166-67,
172 (D. Conn. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 362 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1966).
143. The Advocate General discussed the tendency of large purchasers to
ripen enough bananas to meet their basic requirements but to buy the rest of
their needs from other suppliers "to take advantage of the future market trend."
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 320, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 448 (Opinion of
Advocate General). In other words, even these large purchasing organizations
preferred not to bear the risks themselves.
144. The Advocate General noted that United Brands had wanted to require
its ripeners to place their orders before the bananas were shipped, but had been
unable to do so. Id. at 331, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 462.
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tions when setting its prices.
Barry E. Hawk has inferred from the Court's language in
United Brands that the Court would allow a dominant firm to
base discriminatory prices upon "different demand between immediate purchaser and supplier."' 14 5 What he means by this is unclear. If he is simply referring to the willingness of some buyers to
pay more than other buyers would be willing to pay, which is a
necessary condition for the occurrence of any profitable price discrimination,' 4 he must be wrong. Otherwise, the use of price discrimination by a dominant firm to exploit more fully its monopoly power would always be permissible.
Additionally, the facts in United Brands do not support
Hawk's inference. United Brands' ripeners in the Benelux nations
were willing to pay more for Chiquita bananas than were its ripeners in Germany, Denmark, or Ireland. There was a "different
demand" in those markets, even at the level of sales to the distributor. United Brands faced different demand curves in each
geographical market but the Court prohibited charging different
prices in each market. Hawk's inference, therefore, is unwarranted. It would be a dangerous basis upon which to advise a client with a dominant position in the Common Market.
The third element of article 86(c) is the competitive injury requirement. The Commission sought to show the potential for
competitive injury, at least in the absence of United Brands' prohibition against resales of green bananas by its ripeners. 147 Distributors, the Commission argued, could have resold the bananas
in countries other than those in which they were located. Consequently, the distributors who paid higher prices than similarly located distributors would be at a competitive disadvantage,
whether competing in the low-price or high-price market. 14 Although the factual basis for this argument was dubious, 49 and the

145. B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON
TRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 751 (1979).

MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-

146. F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 315; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 91, at 681.
147. United Brands' contracts with its distributors/ripeners prohibited them
from reselling Chiquita bananas while they were still green (unripened). Since
ripened bananas can be transported only limited distances, this ban effectively
prevented any trade in bananas between the ripeners. The Commission charged
that the resale ban violated article 86, and the Court agreed.
148. 19 O.J. EUR. COMMON (No. L 95) at 14, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D51-

52.
149. But see 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 332-33, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at
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argument itself was speculative until the green-banana clause actually had been withdrawn, the Commission's attempt to satisfy
the article 86(c) requirements is laudable.
The Court of Justice, however, made no such attempt. It
merely recited the obviously incorrect conclusion that certain ripeners/distributors for United Brands were placed at a competitive
disadvantage because competition had been distorted. 15 0 Even accepting, arguendo, the Court's doubtful conclusion that competition had been distorted, United Brands' distributors did not necessarily suffer a competitive disadvantage from that distortion.
Because the weekly prices that United Brands charged its customers were uniform throughout each market, the Commission
correctly perceived that competitive injury could occur only if
competition between distributors located in different markets
were possible. Since the Court disregarded that necessary condition, it effectively dispensed with the Treaty of Rome's requirement of competitive injury. Consequently, the Commission need
show only that a practice "distorts competition," a phrase that
has lost the economic meaning it once had in Common Market
antitrust law. Originally, in Continental Can'5 ' "distorting competition" referred to any change in the market structure that lessened competition. Partitioning markets or refusing to deal with
competitors to eliminate them are examples of distortion of competition. More recently the phrase has come to mean competing
in a manner of which the Commission or the Court does not approve. For example, the Commission and the Court have outlawed such common commercial practices as granting fidelity rebates15 2 and failing to inform dealers in writing of the terms of
their dealership contracts.153 It is this latter meaning that the
phrase has in United Brands.This is an even lower standard than
the competitive injury requirement of section 2(a) of the Robin-

464-65 (Opinion of Advocate General) (containing an extended discussion of the
possibility of trade between ripeners in different countries).
150. Id. at 299, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 500.
151. 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973). Continental Can, supra note 6, involved an already dominant firm's merger. This
merger would have eliminated a significant competitor and strengthened the
dominant position.
152. See infra notes 232-324 and accompanying text.
153. See Bandengroothandel Frieschebrug BV v. Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 353) 33, 43 (1981), 33 Common
Mkt. L.R. 643, 661-62 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 299-324.
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son-Patman Act 154 interpreted in FTC v. Morton Salt Co. 55
Several underlying factors help to explain the United Brands
decision. First, United Brands had the temerity to point to the
Commission's failure to create a common market for bananas
throughout the EEC as the reason that price differentials existed
in the various member countries. The Community authorities
clearly resented this suggestion.1 56 Second, the Commission and
the Court perceived the pattern of different national prices as violating the major goals of Common Market antitrust law-the destruction of barriers to interstate trade and the unification of
markets throughout the Community. Third, although it had not
created the market differences, United Brands nonetheless used
its prohibition on the resale of green bananas to maintain the ex1
isting market segregation.

57

One European commentator, Lucia Zanon di valgiurata, has
suggested that United Brands resale ban possibly did not perpetuate the existing market segregation. 58 Zanon noted that United
Brands was not a monopolist but the leading firm in an oligopolistic market; its competitors retained a fifty-five percent share
of the Community banana market. Thus, by itself, United Brands
could not maintain the market segregation necessary for effective
price discrimination. Unfortunately, Zanon's analysis discounted
the likelihood that oligopolistic pricing was occurring, with
United Brands serving as the price leader and the other firms setting prices at a standard differential below United Brands' price
in each market.1 59 Following United Brands' leadership, not only
on price but also on contract terms, could maximize returns for
the other firms, especially since United Brands had demonstrated
a willingness and capacity to engage in aggressive competition to
protect its market share. Any firm allowing resale of its branded
bananas into a high-priced market, thus lowering the prices there,

154. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).

155. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
156. See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 337, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 499
(Opinion of Advocate General).
157. 19 O.J. EUR, COMM. (No. L 95 ) at 13-14, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 494,

500.
158. Zanon, Price Discrimination Under Article 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty:
The United Brands Case, 31 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 36, 55-57 (1982).
159. See F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 176, 232. Zanon refuses to base his
conclusions upon this possibility because the Court did not do so. Zanon, supra
note 158, at 55-57.
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might find United Brands' reaction unprofitable for all concerned.
In fact, the Court's reference to other banana companies engaging
in conduct similar to that of United Brands suggests oligopolistic
behavior in the Community banana market. 160 If the other firms
were following the lead of United Brands, its resale ban certainly
could have perpetuated the existing market segregation.
The Commission, the Advocate General, and the Court of Justice viewed the resale ban as particularly objectionable because of
its maintenance of the existing market segregation. Yet they also
evidenced confusion about how a dominant firm could segregate
markets. All three stated that the differential pricing was a barrier to the ripeners' sales of bananas in other countries and that it
tended to maintain the different price levels. 161 Of course, this is

not so. Price disparity in different geographical markets encourages sales from low-priced markets into high-priced markets and
thus, increases interstate trade in bananas while breaking down
the barriers to such trade.
According to the Court, United Brands' policy of supplying its
ripeners with fewer Chiquita bananas than they ordered each
week enhanced the effectiveness of its resale prohibition.162 Again,
the Court's analysis is questionable. First, it is doubtful that
United Brands restricted output below the quantity which it expected to be demanded at the prices that it was going to charge.
As explained earlier, orders were placed and quotas allocated
while the banana shipments were at sea; thus, the available quantity was fixed. United Brands subsequently set its prices and allowed its ripeners to cancel or reduce their orders. 163 While

United Brands' goal undoubtedly was to sell all of the bananas en
route, it also may have sought to maximize its profits by selling
the available quantity at the highest prices possible by encourag160. See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 283-84, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 42930.
161. 19 O.J. EuR. CoMM (No. L 95) at 14, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at D51 (decision of E.C. Comm'n); 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 336-37, 21 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 469 (Opinion of Advocate General); 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 299, 21
Common Mkt. L.R. at 500 (Judgment of Court of Justice).
162. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 286, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 492.
163. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 335, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 466-67
(Opinion of Advocate General). In the event that this resulted in a surplus,
United Brands apparently offered these bananas to its other distributors. See id.
at 335, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 467.
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ing sales in the high-price markets.6 4 Although such exploitative
pricing conceivably would violate article 86(a), it does not support
the conclusion that United Brands systematically kept its distributors short of bananas to prevent their potential resale. Second,
the Commission admitted that the price differentials between geographic markets allowed ripeners to trade profitably during only
a few weeks each year. 0 5 It is unlikely that United Brands would
choose to diminish its profitability throughout the year merely to
discourage such occasional trading. Third, even if United Brands
had restricted its output to enhance the effectiveness of the resale
ban, the restriction probably would not have produced the intended result. If the distributor could make a greater profit engaging in arbitrage rather than ripening and wholesaling his entire allocation of Chiquitas, he likely would resell the bananas
even if they were in short supply. In fact, restricting the supply of
bananas actually could increase the attractiveness of arbitrage to
the distributors because (1) the artificial shortage would drive
prices and profits on resale even higher and (2) the distributors
would have already turned to other brands of bananas to fill their
deficit in Chiquitas and therefore would more readily expand the
use of substituted brands.
The Court mischaracterized the resale ban because it failed to
appreciate that United Brands bore most of the risk of shifts in
the demand curve for Chiquita bananas. If the Court had realized
where the risks lay, it might have viewed United Brands' policy as
one of risk reduction by attempting to prevent losses that resulted from the spoilage of perishable bananas. 66 Additionally,
United Brands' shipment in complete shiploads and the distributors' anticipatory exaggeration of orders may have exacerbated
the magnitude of the supply reductions. However, even if the
Court had correctly understood the reasons for United Brands'
actions, it nonetheless might have found them illegal, since the
Court believed that the niggardly supply policies and the ban on
the resale of green bananas maintained the separation of geographical markets in contravention of the Treaty's basic goal of
creating a common market.

164. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 320, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 447.
165. Id. at 333, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 464.
166. Cf. Robinson-Patman Act, § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982) (recognizing
the disposition of perishable goods as a defense to a charge of illegal price
discrimination).
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The Effects of United Brand on the Common Market

Although the United Brands decision is understandable from a
market integration viewpoint, it nonetheless promises unrecognized detrimental economic effects. First, the decision may promote inefficient forward integration. To avoid the restrictions on
price discrimination, United Brands can take over the ripening
and distributing functions in the low-price markets of Ireland and
possibly, Germany and Denmark. If United Brands did not sell to
ripeners in low-price markets, it would have no "equivalent transactions" to trigger article 86(c).1 1' Alternatively, forward integration into the high-price markets could be attractive to some dominant firms desiring to engage in price discrimination.168 Other
solutions include changing the nature of the transactions in some
markets so that they no longer appear equivalent and ceasing to
sell Chiquita brand bananas in some markets, replacing them
with either another brand, perhaps of a different variety, or with
unbranded bananas. Each of these solutions threatens to produce
a distribution system artificially designed to cope with legal restrictions through less efficient means than those prohibited by
the Court's interpretation of article 86(c) in United Brands. Professor W. Bishop of the London School of Economics notes that
no one benefits from this "inefficiency created solely by legal decision;" it is pure waste. e9 Surely the Commission and the Court of
Justice do not really believe the European economy is doing so
170
well that it can afford such waste.

The second unrecognized, detrimental economic effect of the
decision is that it will affect the quantity of bananas sold in the
national markets of the EEC. United Brands must chose either:
(1) to price for the high-priced market, and, thus, eliminate sales
167. Cf. O'Byrne v. Cheker Oil Co., 727 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding

that transfers to company-owned stations could not be used as sales to establish

price discrimination in violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act).
168. See, e.g., Instituto Chemiaterapio Italiano S.p.A. & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 223, 13 Common Mkt. L.R. 309 (1974).
169. Bishop, Price Discrimination Under Article 86: Political Economy in
the European Court, 44 MOD. L. REV. 282, 285 (1981).
170. Commentators have estimated that the waste caused in the United
States economy by the Robinson-Patman Act runs at least into the hundreds of
millions of dollars a year. R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 384 n.* (1978). Although the basis for such an "estimate" may be
suspect, there can be little doubt that the waste in such cases can be staggering.
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in Ireland and reduce sales in Germany and Denmark; (2) to price
for the low-priced market and increase sales in Benelux; or (3) to
price for the market as a whole, producing a combination of these
effects. Since the Commission lost its exploitative pricing case
under article 86(a), United Brands is not compelled to cut its
prices; it might choose to raise them in the low-priced markets.
Whatever its choice, the effect will not be limited to Chiquita bananas because other firms may be expected to follow its
leadership.
The third unrecognized, and most startling, detrimental economic effect of the United Brands decision is the redistribution
of income from the poorer countries in the EEC to the wealthier
ones.17 1 Since United Brands can no longer price discriminate, it

undoubtedly will raise its prices in Ireland, if it sells bananas
there at all, and it may lower its prices in the Benelux countries
as well. Although the banana market produces anomalous redistributive effects between the other EEC countries, it is true, as
Professor Bishop suggests, that a decision outlawing price discrimination usually "redistributes income away from consumers
in the poorer regions of Europe and toward consumers in the
richer regions."17 2 This is a bizarre, and obviously unintended, re-

sult for the Community, which spends vast sums of money to narrow the economic gaps between its regions.
On the other hand, the decision may have unintended favorable
economic effects. It is likely to contribute to the break-down of
oligopolistic pricing coordination by facilitating "cheating" by banana importers. One of the criticisms of the Robinson-Patman
Act in the United States is that it maintains oligopolistic interdependence and the attendant higher prices. 173 The prohibition of
price discrimination contained in section 2(a) of the Act applies
to any seller and thus to every member of an oligopoly. The section outlaws sporadic price discrimination which is competitive
and which might serve to break down the coordinated pricing in
171. Bishop, supra note 169, at 288-89.
172. Id. at 289. The banana market appears to be anomolous because some
of the lower prices are found in the wealthier areas such as Germany. This
merely demonstrates that factors other than income levels affect demand curves.
Nonetheless, Professor Bishop's claim that discriminating monopolists will usually find it profitable to charge higher prices in higher income countries and

lower prices in lower income countries seems generally correct.
173. F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 324, 571; see L. Sur.LivA, supra note 91,
at 682, 686.
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the oligopoly and thus reduce price levels. 17 4 Because the prohibition in article 86(c) does not apply to every member of the oligopoly, but only to the dominant firm, smaller firms in the Common
Market can compete with the largest firm through sporadic pricecutting, with the knowledge that the large firm's response is legally restricted. 1 5 The dominant firm, of course, can cut its prices
generally, but such price cutting is a costly course. Certainly, the
dominant firm cannot engage in widespread price discrimination
to discipline the price cutter. Whether the dominant firm can respond to the lower price offered by its competitor, matching it for
that customer or class of customers, remains uncertain.
Although the United Brands' decisions contain no discussion of
the "meeting competition" defense, Professor Hawk believes that
it is available in the EEC because the Court and Commission rejected it on factual, not legal, grounds. 7 6 No specific language in
either United Brands opinion supports this proposition; instead,
one merely finds a statement by the Advocate General that a
dominant firm may not "align his prices on those of his competitors."17 7 More instructive are the Commission's treatment of the
meeting competition defense in AKZO Chemie'" and the Court's
United Brands holding, in connection with another type of abuse,
that a dominant firm has the right to defend itself but that its
response must be proportional to the competitive threat that it is
combating.17 9 Apparently, a dominant firm is entitled to discriminate to meet a competitive bid, but it cannot undercut that bid or
extend the discriminatory lower price to other customers. Even
such a restricted meeting-competition defense would encourage
cheating by the smaller firms in the oligopoly because they are
protected against retaliatory price discrimination by the dominant leader. Thus article 86(c), as interpreted in United Brands,
undermines oligopolistic price rigidity.
Had the Commission and the Court engaged in careful, in-

174. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 91, at 683-86.
175. See F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 200, 222-25 (discussing how limitations upon the dominant firm's ability to respond to sporadic price cutting undermine oligopolistic coordination).
176. B. HAWK, supra note 145, at 751.
177. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 336-37, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 469
(Opinion of Advocate General).
178. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 13, 78 Common Mkt. L. R. 694 (1983)
(interim order). See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
179. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 293, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 496-97.
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formed economic analysis, they might have concluded that the
price discrimination practiced by United Brands was, on balance,
harmful and that it should therefore be prohibited. In addition to
their market integration rationale, they properly could have expressed concern that such systematic price discrimination would
harm competition and increase barriers to entry.18 0 Furthermore,
since United Brands used this price discrimination to exploit
more fully whatever power it had by virtue of its product differentiation,"s ' consistency dictates that Common Market antitrust
law prohibit it as other forms of exploitation are prohibited. However, United Brands was not carefully nor rationally decided. The
Commission and the Court of Justice understood neither the conduct they were judging nor the effects of their decisions. If one
believes that antitrust authorities and courts ought to understand
what they are doing, United Brands is a most disturbing case.
3.

Comparison of United States and Community Treatment
of Price Discrimination

Only a few United States cases touch upon the issues raised in
United Brands. It is interesting that some of them involve United
Fruit Company, the corporate predecessor of United Brands. In
United Banana Company v. United Fruit Company8 2 the complaint alleged that United Fruit had violated section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act'8 3 by charging the plaintiff, a Connecticut
banana ripener and wholesaler, more than its New York competitors paid. In concluding that the plaintiff had not proven any injury to competition, the court commented upon the legality of
charging different prices in different geographical markets.'8 4 Although the opinion is far from a model of clarity, it indicates that
the Robinson-Patman Act can only be violated if there is compe-

180. See F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 324.
181. Although the Commission, 9 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) at 11-13, 17
Common Mkt. L.R. at D46-50, and the Court based their findings of dominance
upon other factors, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 270-85, 21 Common Mkt. L.R.

at 481-90, United Brands possessed power because Chiquita bananas were to
some extent, and to a greater extent were perceived to be, better than other
bananas.
182. 245 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1965), aff'd per curiam 362 F.2d 849 (2d Cir.

1966).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
184. 245 F. Supp. at 172-76.
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tition between the participants in the two markets.'8 5
In addition, the court in United Banana carefully considered
the equivalence of each of the transactions for which discriminatory prices were alleged and concluded that only two of them
were equivalent, since the other transactions involved a different
type or poorer quality fruit.'8 6 The two instances of discrimination were de minimis and, therefore, could have no competitive
11
impact.
The United Banana case highlights one of the principal differences between the treatment of price discrimination in the United
States and that in the Common Market. Usually price discrimination is challenged in the U.S. under the Robinson-Patman Act
rather than section 2 of the Sherman Act, even if the discriminator is a monopolist. Although United Banana included a claim
that United Fruit had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
price discrimination allegation was not included in that count.
United Fruit is a secondary-line injury case, as are most of the
price discrimination cases brought under the Robinson-Patman
Act. "' In such cases, the Act's competitive injury requirement is
satisfied by showing that the disfavored purchasers were placed at
a competitive disadvantage relative to those purchasers receiving
the lower price. In Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC,"', for example, the defendants sold glucose to candy manufacturers at discriminatory prices that varied as much as nineteen percent. 9 0
The Court concluded that manufacturers who had paid higher
prices suffered competitive harm, 19' because glucose was the principal ingredient in much low-priced candy, profit margins were
low, and price was the principal determinant of sales. 9 2 However,
the harm suffered was not "competitive" at all; the competitive
structure and process of the industry had not been injured. The
most serious harm that could be claimed was that several manufacturers had moved their factories from Kansas City to Chicago

185. See id. See also Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 734
(1945) (holding that a seller's discrimination between buyers in different localities was forbidden if they competed with each other).
186. 362 F.2d at 851.
187. Id. at 851, n.2.
188. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 91, at 691.
189. 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
190. Id. at 731.
191. Id. at 731-32.
192.

Id. at 738-39.
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to take advantage of the lower prices 19 3 and that the profit margins of the disadvantaged buyers had been reduced.19 4 The FTC
could not show that sales had been diverted from those buying at
higher prices, and the Court did not find that the existence of
even a single buyer had been threatened. Thus, the RobinsonPatman competitive injury requirement is satisfied in secondary
line cases by any competitive or financial harm to any buyer.
In FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,' 95 the Supreme Court took the diversion test a step further, holding that a threat of substantial
injury could be shown even in the unquestioned absence of any
possibility of competitive injury to the disfavored buyers or any
injury to the competitive structure or process. 9 6 Nonetheless, the
Court continued to emphasize that the disfavored customers competed with those receiving the lower price. 97 Competitive injury
under the Robinson-Patman Act, therefore, still requires a showing that the purchasers in the discriminatory transactions compete with each other. This sharply contrasts with the Court of
Justice's elimination of competitive disadvantage from article
86(c) in United Brands.
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Falls City
9 3 provides an interesting
Industries,Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.1
comparison with the treatment of price discrimination in United
Brands. Like United Brands, Falls City Industries sold a homogeneous product at a single location at prices that depended upon
the state in which the buyer distributed the product. The discrimination provoked a high-priced buyer, Vanco, to bring an antitrust suit because it believed that its wholesale sales had been
reduced by the lower price Falls City charged a neighboring distributor, Dawson Springs. Vanco was the sole distributor of Falls
City Beer in Evansville, Indiana, and Dawson Springs was the
wholesaler for Henderson, Kentucky, a community located only
ten miles from Evansville. However, the two distributors could
not compete directly, because it was illegal for the Indiana wholesaler to sell to retailers in Kentucky and for Indiana retailers to

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 739.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 91, at 692.
334 U.S. 37 (1948).
See 334 U.S. at 55, 60-61 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
Id. at 46-47.
460 U.S. 428 (1983).
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buy from out-of-state wholesalers. 199 However, Henderson and
Evansville constituted a single metropolitan market within which
residents of one state would go into the other state to buy beer if
it was significantly cheaper. 0 0 Therefore, in Falls City the competition was at the retail, or tertiary, level.
Because Falls City had made sales at different prices, the Court
was faced with two issues: (1) Was there a reasonable possibility
that the price differential might cause competitive injury under
the Corn Products/Morton Salt test? and (2) Were Falls City's
lower prices in Kentucky privileged under the meeting competition defense? The Court answered both questions affirmatively.
Although the case involved tertiary, rather than secondary,
competitive injury, the Court applied the Morton Salt holding
that "injury to competition is established prima facie by proof of
a substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers
over time."2 0 1 The competition between the customers of Vanco
and Dawson Springs satisfied the competing purchasers requirement.20 2 The Court not only inferred lost sales and profits from
the persistent price differential, but also relied upon direct evidence as well. The only competitive injury that Vanco needed to
prove to establish a violation of section 2(a) was that it had lost
sales of Falls City Beer due to the discrimination. 0 3 Since Vanco
did not have to show that its existence or competitive strength
was threatened, it easily met the competitive injury requirement.
The Court's treatment of the second issue is more remarkable.
Falls City sought to defend itself under section 2(b)'s meeting
competition defense, arguing that it had aligned its prices with
prevailing prices in the markets. The Court of Appeals had rejected this defense on three grounds: (1) Falls City's price discrimination had been on a territorial rather than a customer-bycustomer basis; (2) Falls City had not lowered its prices to meet
competition in Kentucky; and (3) Falls City's prices in Indiana
were "artificially high. 2 0 4 The Supreme Court rejected all three
arguments and held that Falls City would be entitled to the meet199. Id. at 432.
200. Id. at 433, 437 n.8. Although crossing state lines to purchase beer was
illegal under Indiana law, evidence showed that this occurred regularly and significantly affected sales volumes. Id. at 437 n.8.
201. Id. at 435.
202. Id. at 437-38.
203. Id. at 437.
204. Id. at 441-42.
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ing competition defense if it could show, on remand, that its
lower prices in Kentucky had been offered in the good faith belief
that the same prices were generally available from its competitors
there.205

Thus, under the Robinson-Patman Act a firm is permitted to
align its prices with the prices of its competitors in each geographical market.20 In the low-price market the firm is protected
by the meeting competition defense; in the high-price market it is
free to price its product to maximize its profits.2 0 7 Although Falls

City did not involve a dominant firm, the same principles would
seem to apply since the decisive issue in the case was the meeting
competition defense, not the question of competitive effect.2 0

Even under the Sherman Act a monopolist is generally free to
price its product to maximize profits unless it does so to acquire
or maintain monopoly power.
One group of secondary line cases involved challenges to price
discrimination under section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5
of the FTC Act rather than section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act.209 The LaPeyre family owned and operated the Grand Cail-

205. Id. at 451.
206. Falls City makes this clear with regard to secondary and tertiary line
injury. Although Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), 289 F.2d 835
(7th Cir. 1961) (on remand), might be interpreted as indicating that matching
the prices of rivals in a market violates section 2(a) if it causes primary-line
competitive injury, this seems a doubtful result today. Predatory conduct is unlikely to be found from matching, rather than undercutting, the prices of rivals.
See, e.g., 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Pacific Engineering & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); International
Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). But see Power Replacements Corp. v. Air Preheater
Co., 356 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1973); cf. Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal
Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1976) (basing its holding that there was
evidence sufficient to support the jury inference of primary line injury upon,
inter alia, the defendant's undercutting its competitor's prices).
207. 460 U.S. at 439.
208. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 1961) (indicating that the market share of the defendant was relevant to the determination of competitive effect); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250-51 (1951)
(holding that the meeting competition defense is available regardless of whether
the price discrimination injured competition).
209. This line of cases did not consider violations under the Robinson-Patman Act because the challenged discrimination involved lease rates, a subject
not covered by the Robinson-Patman Act. See, e.g., Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v.
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lou Packing Company, a shrimp packing business on the Louisiana Gulf Coast. During the late 1940s the LaPeyres invented, perfected, patented, and began using a shrimp-peeling machine that
was much cheaper than traditional hand-peeling. In 1949 the
LaPeyres, through their new company, Peelers, offered to lease
the machine to other Gulf Coast packers; soon, all area packers
had become lessees. Without the Peelers machine, no packing
company could stay in business.
During the 1950s the LaPeyre family offered to lease the
Peelers machine in the Pacific Northwest, where the prohibitive
cost of hand-peeling the smaller Pacific shrimp had prevented the
development of a shrimp canning industry. Because the shrimp
were about half the size of Gulf shrimp and it took approximately
the same labor to peel a small shrimp as a large one, Peelers set
the rental rate at double that charged Gulf Coast plants 1
In 1964 the Federal Trade Commission brought an action
against the LaPeyres and their companies under section 5 of the
FTC Act 21 1 because they were charging discriminatory prices that
injured the industry they had created by leasing their machine to
Northwestern processors. 212 The FTC thought it irrelevant that
the "victims" were much better off than they would have been
had Peelers declined to lease the machines to them, as was indisputably its right.213 The FTC held that the LaPeyres had engaged
in an unfair trade practice or method of competition. The majority of the Commissioners based the holding upon their finding
that the LaPeyres had used their monopoly in the market for
shrimp peeling machinery to protect their interests as shrimp
canners. 214 One Commissioner disagreed and found no factual basis for the majority's finding. In addition, the Commissioner concluded such a finding was unnecessary for a section 5 violation. In
his opinion, section 5 had been violated because the discriminatory prices inflicted a competitive injury upon a class of custom-

Ammex Warehouse Co., 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000
(1971). Contra, Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 296-97 (1966).
210. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1966).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
212. Grand Cailou Packing Co., 65 FTC, 799, 804 (1964), aff'd sub nom.
LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
213. See W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ]ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 107-08 (1973); Baxter, supra note 209, at 289-91.
214. 65 F.T.C. at 845-47.
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ers. Under this theory, Peelers had abused its monopoly power
and had engaged in an unfair method of competition by preventing canners in the Pacific Northwest from competing
2 15
effectively.
The Fifth Circuit declined to choose between the two theories,
holding that both were valid: "the utilization of monopoly power
in one market resulting in discrimination and the curtailment of
competition in another" violates section 5.216 However, the Sec-

ond Circuit has refused to follow this broad rule. Accepting the
Commission majority's finding that the LaPeyres had charged the
discriminatory prices to aid their shrimp packing operations, it
characterized LaPeyre as a leveraging case and refused to extend
the prohibition to cases that did not involve leveraging.117 The

Second Circuit held that a monopolist has no duty to deal fairly
unless it competes with the disfavored customers and thus stands
to gain from their injury.
Whether a monopolist's discrimination against customers with
whom it does not compete violates section 2 of the Sherman Act
is as uncertain as the issue under section 5 of the FTC Act. Federal district courts have reached conflicting results." However,
the Fifth Circuit has held that its LaPeyre standard does not apply under section 2,219 and the Seventh Circuit has indicated that
it agrees. 220 Thus, such discrimination probably does not violate
section 2 and possibly does not violate section 5 except in the
215. 65 FTC 867-69 (Elman, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The theory of Commissioner Elman logically would forbid not only discriminatory terms but also discriminatory refusals to deal.
216. 366 F.2d at 121.
217. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981). Leveraging is the use of monopoly power in
one market to curtail competition in another market in which the monopolist
competes. Using this theory to explain LaPeyre's conduct is economically dubious; the LaPeyres could have avoided competition from shrimp canners in the
Pacific Northwest by not leasing the machine to them and thus not creating
competitors in the first place. See W. BowMAN, supra note 213, at 108.
218. Compare Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966)
(finding illegal monopolization) with Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F.
Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965) (supplemental opinion reversing a prior finding of
violation).
219. See Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1248 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
220. See Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Products, Inc., 438 F.2d 733, 739 (7th
Cir. 1971),cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).

19851

ANTITRUST REGULATION

Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. This result sharply contrasts with
the article 86 rule that a dominant firm may not unfairly discriminate against some of its customers, even if it will not benefit
thereby.
Although the Shrimp Peelers cases have been rightly criticized, 22 - as a general proposition it is proper to base a claim of
illegal monopolization upon price discrimination which causes
primary-line injury. In such a case, the monopolist stands to gain
from the harm inflicted; it is acquiring, maintaining, or enhancing
monopoly power.22 2 In Janich Brothers, Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 223 the Ninth Circuit discussed the standards for finding
competitive harm in a primary-line case under the Sherman Act.
The court held that the substantial injury requirement of Robinson-Patman Act section 2(a) was also a requirement of section 2
of the Sherman Act when the claim of monopolization or atof primarytempted monopolization is based upon the infliction
224
line injury by geographical price discrimination.
Although Janich Brothers requires a finding of substantial injury to competition as an element of monopolization, courts can
gut this requirement by falling into the trap of Utah Pie Co. v.
ContinentalBaking Co.2 25 Doing so would pervert Janich Brothers by lowering the standards under section 2 instead of raising
them as the Ninth Circuit intended. The test for illegal monopolization is acquiring, maintaining, or enhancing monopoly power.22 6
Merely competing successfully and, therefore, harming competitors by taking business away from them or reducing their profits
227
is not monopolization.
Herein lies the anomaly. Because Robinson-Patman section
2(a) is an incipiency statute, discrimination having only the potential to cause competitive harm may violate it. 228 Although the

221. E.g., 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 78, at I 729d; W. BOWMAN,
supra note 213, at 105-11; L. SULLVAN, supra note 91, at 451; Baxter, supra note
209, at 289-99.
222. See, e.g., Power Replacements Corp. v. Air Preheater Co., 356 F. Supp.
872 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
223. 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
224. Id. at 855.
225. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
226. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
227. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
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statutory language requires that the threatened harm be substantial, courts have not treated this as a significant limitation. Indeed, as an example of how United States courts typically cannot
distinguish competitive harm from competition itself, the Supreme Court was willing in Utah Pie to find substantial primaryline injury to a firm having the largest share of the market, with
increasing sales and revenues throughout the period of the discrimination, although the defendant had a market share ranging
from 1.8 percent to 8.3 percent 22 and the Court admitted that
the impact on Utah Pie as a competitor was negligible. 23 0 In contrast, the court in JanichBrothers used the substantial injury requirement of section 2(a) to heighten the requirements for Sherman Act condemnation of discriminatory pricing. A firm can
violate the Robinson-Patman Act even though it has no market
power but cannot violate section 2 of the Sherman Act without it.
Thus, logically, a showing of a smaller threat of competitive injury by a powerful firm might satisfy the section 2 requirements
than would be necessary under Robinson-Patman. 231 Nonetheless,
surely some degree of competitive harm is required to convict a
firm of monopolizing a market.
This points out the difference between monopolization and
abuse of a dominant position. The former involves the acquisition, enhancement, or maintenance of monopoly power; the latter,
its misuse. United States' law seems principally designed to encourage erosion of market power, while EEC policies attempt to
regulate its use. However, the Robinson-Patman Act cases' concern about "fairness" and protecting small firms from the effects
of competition is echoed in the Common Market enforcement of
article 86(c).

229.

386 U.S. at 689, 691 n.7 (1967).

230. Id. at 699-700. But in Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir.

1968), the court was much more rigorous in demanding that the FTC demonstrate competitive harm in a primary-line case, especially since the defendant
only obtained a two percent share in the market it had entered with lower
prices. The court required that the FTC establish a causal link between the dis-

crimination and the alleged harm. This represents another stark contrast between United States and EEC law regulating price discrimination.
231. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 91, at 685, citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 1961).
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B. Fidelity Rebates and Quantity Discounts
1. Sugar Cartel
Fidelity rebates by dominant firms have been a major concern
under EEC competition law. Beginning with the EuropeanSugar
Cartel case,23 2 fidelity rebates have been treated as an abuse prohibited by article 86(c). In the Sugar case Sudzucker-Verkauf
(SZV), one of the defendants, had a dominant position in the
sugar production industry in southern Germany. SZV granted rebates to customers who purchased all of their sugar requirements
from it. In many cases these rebates were contained in written
contracts that obligated the purchaser to buy all of its sugar from
SZV. In others, the obligation was understood but not express.
Furthermore, if the purchaser preferred, SZV would deduct the
amount as a discount from the invoice price. 233
The Commission and the Court drew a clear distinction between the fidelity rebates offered by SZV and quantity discounts.
The reduction SZV offered did not depend upon the quantity of
sugar each buyer purchased, but upon its purchasing all of its
needs from SZV. This was a fidelity or loyalty rebate, and as such
it presented more serious possibilities for abuse. The Court characterized loyalty rebates as violating both article 86(c)'s prohibition of discrimination and article 86(b)'s prohibition upon limiting markets.3 4
The Court's application of article 86(c) to SZV's fidelity rebates
was formalistic, not analytical. Each element of the provision was
checked off. The Court concluded that:
(1) Because some buyers got the rebate and others did not, they
paid different3 5net prices. Therefore, dissimilar conditions had
2
been applied.

(2) The transactions were equivalent because the quantities
purchased by favored and disfavored purchasers might have been
232. Re European Sugar Cartel, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 140) 17 (1973), 12
Common Mkt. L.R. D65 (1973); In re the European Sugar Cartel: Coiperatieve
Vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission of the European Communities, 1975
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1663, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. 295 (1976).
233. 12 Common Mkt. L.R. at D105-07.
234. 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at 472-73. The violation of article 86(b)'s prohibition was the more serious, although the Court did not seem to realize it.
235. Id. at 472.
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identical.2 36 The Court focused upon the physical, not economic,
equivalence of the transactions, as it would in United Brands,
and thought that the economic differences between the transactions-that the purchasers receiving the loyalty rebates had permitted SZV to plan its production and to save selling and other
transaction costs, and thus to achieve efficiencies-were
irrelevant.
(3) The disfavored purchasers were placed at a competitive disadvantage simply because they competed with the favored
purchasers.23
The Court's focusing upon article 86(c) and characterizing loyalty rebates as exploitative abuses under it was unfortunate. The
true difference between loyalty rebates and quantity discounts is
not in the effect they have upon customers. Customers are paid
for their loyalty; there is no reason to believe that they accept less
than such loyalty costs them. 38 Nor is a meaningful distinction

found in the equivalence of transactions. The Court could as logically conclude that purchases of different quantities, after adjustment for cost differences, should be considered equivalent and,
therefore, that quantity rebates which are not fully cost-justified
violate article 86(c), too.2"'
The analysis should focus on the effect that the rebates or discounts have upon competitors of the seller. By determining
whether the rebate is anticompetitively abusive, producing primary-line injury, the Court of Justice could establish a meaningful basis for distinguishing between rebates that should be forbidden and those that should be allowed.2 40 Article 86(b) ought to be

the gauge. Although the Court did condemn SZV's loyalty rebates
236. Id.
237. Id. at 472-73. Siragusa recognized, even before the Court's United
Brands decision completed the process, that European Sugar Cartel threatened
to deprive article 86(c)'s "competitive disadvantage" requirement of any significance. Siragusa, supra note 136, at 425.
238. See Korah, Interpretationand Application of Article 86 of the Treaty
of Rome: Abuse of a Dominant Position within the Common Market, 53 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 768, 796-97 (1978).
239. Siragusa, supra note 136, at 426; cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S.
37, 43 (1948).
240. See F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 584-86. Bellamy and Child, who first
suggested the now widely accepted analytical device of dividing article 86 abuses
into anticompetitive and exploitative abuses, classify loyalty rebates as anticompetitive abuses akin to requirements contracts. C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra

note 7, %7-60.
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under article 86(b), 241 this condemnation seems to be an after-

thought, without analysis, and not the true basis for the
decision.242
In assessing the legality of fidelity rebates, the Court should
weigh the benefit against the harm.243 Because fidelity rebates operate like requirements contracts, but with less complete foreclosure, they should be subjected to similar scrutiny. In Standard
Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations),244 the United
States Supreme Court, when confronted with the question of the
appropriate standard for determining the legality of requirements
contracts under section 3 of the Clayton Act, acknowledged their
possible significant benefits.245 Justice Frankfurter, however,
doubted the ability of courts to recognize and weigh the pro- and
anticompetitive effects of requirements contracts, and thus he
adopted a rule of modified per se illegality that outlawed requirements contracts that foreclose "a substantial share of the line of
commerce affected.

'24

Justice Jackson, in dissent, displayed no

such reservations; he argued that the courts could and must obey
the statutory mandate to determine whether the practice sub-

247
stantially lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly.

Surely the Common Market would be better off if the Commission and the Court of Justice were to adopt a test based upon the
effects of fidelity rebates. However, their acceptance of the economically enlightened approach of Justice Jackson, weighing the
pro- and anticompetitive effects of the particular restraint and
thus avoiding unnecessary loss of efficiencies and other advantages,248 seems too much to realistically expect in the foreseeable
241. 17 Common Mkt. L.R. at 473.
242. See 2 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY, 3-268 (1984 Supp.).
243. See Zanon, Price Discriminationand Hoffmann-La Roche, 15 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 305, 316-17 (1981).
244. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
245. Id. at 306-07. See F. SCHERER,supra note 24, at 584-86 (discussing their
possible efficiencies).
246. 337 U.S. at 314.
247. Id. at 321-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 321-22 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson's argument presaged the
recent judicial willingness to use a rule of reason analysis to weigh the economic
effects of challenged conduct. E.g. Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433
U.S. 36 (1977); see also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974).
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future.2 49 At least, though, the Court should require that the

Commission demonstrate that the fidelity rebate affects a substantial portion of the market.
Standard
Stations and Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal
250
Co.

are indicative of the results which might be expected from

such an approach. In Standard Stations the principal defendant,
Standard Oil of California, was the largest gasoline supplier in the
western United States, controlling about twenty-three percent of
the market. Standard had requirements contracts with 6,000 independently owned stations, sixteen percent of the retail outlets,
covering seven percent of the gasoline sold. In addition, Standard
sold about the same amount of gasoline through company-owned
stations. The use of the requirements contracts was widespread;
they were employed by Standard's six leading competitors, who
together possessed forty-two percent of the retail market.2 51 The
Court found that Standard's contracts foreclosed a substantial
share of the market and were, thus, illegal.252 Conversely, in
Tampa Electric the Court concluded that a twenty-year requirements contract to supply $128 million worth of coal for an electric
generating station 253 did not foreclose a substantial share of the
market. Broadly defining an economically meaningful market, the
Court concluded that the foreclosure was less than one percent,
an amount not substantial enough to render the contract illegal.254 The significant analytical difference between the two cases
is not that Standard Stations involved the leading firm in the
market, 25 5 but that the percentages of the market foreclosed by

each firm's requirements contracts were different.256 A dominant
249. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 584-86, 26 Common Mkt. L.R.
211, 245-47 (1979) (Opinion of Advocate General) (considering and rejecting this
approach under article 86).
250. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).

251.
252,
253.
254.

337 U.S. at 295.
Id. at 314.
365 U.S. at 322.
Id. at 331-34.

255. A firm in Standard's position within the Common Market might be held

to be dominant, so that its conduct would be measured under article 86.
256. Because Tampa Electric interpreted the Standard Stations holding to
embody a partly structural test, the foreclosure caused by similar contracts of
competing firms is relevant as well. See Zanon, supra note 243, at 315-16.

A similar approach was used under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in
United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (decided
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firm might enter into requirements contracts, or fidelity rebate
agreements having similar effects, with only a few of its customers, or only for limited periods, and the foreclosure would be

minimal.257
2.

Hoffmann-La Roche

In Community v. Hoffmann-La Roche2 5 the Commission attacked loyalty rebates that tied an entire line of products, instead
of merely operating as surrogate requirements contracts. Although relying in part on the same formalistic application of article 86(c) that had been successful in the Sugar Cartel case,259 the
Commission went beyond this simplistic formalism. The Court
engaged in a more detailed analysis of the rebate practices, measuring their supposed economic effects against article 86's general
prohibition of abuse of a dominant position as well as the specific

kinds of conduct outlawed in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of the
0
article.

26

Hoffmann-La Roche, the world's largest pharmaceutical company, was the leading seller of bulk vitamins throughout the
world as well as in the Common Market. It was the only firm that
offered all thirteen types of vitamins. 26 1 Although La Roche sold
vitamins in the EEC through an extensive sales network to 5,000
customers in the pharmaceutical, food, and animal feed industries, it only granted loyalty rebates to twenty-two of the largest
of these customers, whose purchases accounted for twenty-six
after and discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Stations), in
which the court applied a limited rule of reason analysis to hold five-year requirements contracts illegal because their duration was excessive. Id. at 31.
257. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 223) 27, 31, 18
Common Mkt. L.R. D25, D32 (1976) (where only twenty-two of the firm's 5,000
customers were granted fidelity rebates).
258. Community v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 223) 27
(1976), 18 Common Mkt. L.R. D25 (1976); Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. 211 (1979).
259. 19 O.J. EuP. COMM. at 36-37, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D41; see
Siragusa, supra note 136, at 425.
260. See 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 554-55, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 301.
261. La Roche manufactured eight types of vitamins and purchased and resold the other five vitamins. La Roche's market share ranged from 47% to 95%
for vitamins that it manufactured and from 10% to 68% for vitamins that it
resold. Its share of the total vitamin market was 60%. 19 O.J. EUR. Comm. at 2829, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D28-30.
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percent of its sales and sixteen percent of the total vitamin sales
262
in the Common Market.
The fidelity rebates took three forms: some customers entered
into contracts with La Roche obligating them to purchase a substantial percentage of their requirements, usually eighty or ninety
percent, from La Roche in return for a rebate upon the year's
purchases; other contracts provided for the rebate if a specified
percentage of the customer's vitamin needs were purchased from
La Roche, but contained no requirement that the customer do so;
the rest of the fidelity rebates were granted on an informal basis
if the customer had purchased all or nearly all of its requirements
from La Roche during the year.2 63 La Roche calculated the percentages purchased by aggregating vitamins of all types; purchasers could not earn the rebate with respect to particular types. The
rebates were usually a fixed percentage, ranging from one to five
percent depending upon the contract; a few contracts provided a
sliding scale of rebates based upon the percentage of the customer's purchases which was obtained from La Roche.26 4 Some of
the fidelity rebates were disguised as del credere commissions
paid to the purchaser's parent corporation in return for its guarantee of payment for the vitamins. 2615 In one case, the rebate was
based upon the quantities purchased, but the scale was set to assure sales of most of the customer's requirements.2 6
The Commission's decision focused on the proper classification
of the rebates. La Roche claimed they were quantity discounts,
legal under article 86(c) as interpreted in the Sugar case. The
Commission, however, concluded that they were fidelity rebates. 6 7 Although it found that the rebates violated article 86(c)
since each of the requirements of that provision, as watered down
in previous cases, was met,268 the Commission did not rest its decision merely on such formalistic reasoning. Instead, it sought to
determine the economic effects of the rebates on the Community

262.

Id. at 31, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D32.

263. Id. at 34-35, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D37.
264. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 568-87, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 248
(Opinion of Advocate General). Merck, one of La Roche's largest customers, was
given rebates ranging between 12.5% and 20%. Id. at 589, 26 Common Mkt.
L.R. at 251.
265. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. at 34, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D36-37.
266. See id. at 34, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D37.
267. Id. at 36, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D40.
268. Id. at 36-37, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D39-41.
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vitamin market and to measure those effects against the general
prohibition of article 86. In this analysis, the Commission was
guided by the basic objective of article 3(f) of the Treaty-that
competition in the Common Market not be distorted.2 69 It concluded that the rebates did distort competition, especially because of the tying effects of the across-the-board rebates and the
foreclosure of those major customers to La Roche's
competitors.2 70
The Court's analysis started off simply, but quickly got deeper,
wider-ranging, and more troubling than the Commission's. The
Court first labelled La Roche's discounts, approving the Commission's conclusion that fidelity rebates were involved in each type
of contract.2 7 ' It next ruled that fidelity rebates granted by a firm
in a dominant position are abusive, thus virtually deciding the
issue. 272 As in the Sugar case, the Court based its conclusion
partly on article 86(c), and, as in Sugar, its analysis of the discrimination was formalistic and selective. Neither the Advocate
General 27 3 nor the Court 27 4 considered whether the transactions
were actually equivalent. Furthermore, the Court's treatment of
competitive disadvantage was neither principled nor realistic. The
Court simply concluded that because the rebates were significant
to customers and important to La Roche, they must have caused
competitive disadvantage to disfavored customers.2 75
In addition to applying the specific provisions of article 86(c),
the Court tried to analyze the rebates under more general principles of Community law, such as distortion of competition. The
analysis is confusing; the standard, obscure:
Finally, these practices by an undertaking in a dominant position
and especially on an expanding market tend to consolidate this position by means of a form of competition which is not based on the
The concept
transactionseffected and is therefore distorted....
of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence
269. See id. See also Siragusa, supra note 136, at 431-32.
270. See 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. at 36, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. at D39-40.
271. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 541-44, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 291-93.
272. Id. at 539-40, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 289-90.
273. See 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 591-92, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 25254 (Opinion of Advocate General).
274. See 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 540-41, 548-51, 26 Common Mkt. L.R.
at 290, 295-98.
275. See id. at 552, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 299.

58

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 18:1

the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of
the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened
and which, through recourse to methods different from those
which condition normal competition in products or services on the
basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of
still exhindering the maintenance of the degree of competition
271
isting in the market or the growth of that competition.
Thus, the Court set forth four characteristics of abusive conduct:
it is competition not based on the transactions themselves; it uses
methods different from those of normal competition; it influences
the structure of the market; and it must have an adverse effect on
competition and not merely on competitors.
Considering the Hoffmann-La Roche facts, the Court's first
characteristic is easily understood. Since the rebate was fixed not
merely with regard to the quantity purchased from La Roche but
also the quantity not purchased from it, there was competition
not based on the transactions with La Roche.
The Court's second characteristic is far more troubling. Both
the Court and Commission have demonstrated a tendency to substitute their judgment of what is "normal competition" for that of
businessmen and the marketplace. 7 7 "Normal" is not used descriptively to indicate common or usual practices, but normatively, with the norms being the subjective ones of the Court and
Commission. Thus "methods different from those which condition
normal competition" may be paraphrased as methods of competition of which the EEC authorities do not approve, such as fidelity
rebates, requirements contracts, or reciprocal dealing arrangements. The Court expressed its view that "such contracts . . .
contain a sufficient incentive to reserve to Roche the sole right to
supply the purchaser for them to be, for this reason alone, an
abuse .. "2"78 The Court also condemned one of La Roche's requirements contracts even though it did not provide for rebates
276. Id. at 540-41, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 290-91 (emphasis added).
277. The Court describes the concept of abuse with its favorite talisman, the
word "objective." The Court and the Commission regularly condemn defendants
because their proffered justifications are not "objective" or because their conduct violates the "objective" standard of abuse. "Objective" violations usually
mean that the Court and Commission do not understand or appreciate the significance of the justification or that the conduct violates their moral or ethical
sensibilities. Thus, the Court and Commission use the term "objective" as a euphemism for their subjective predilections.
278. Id. at 547, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 295-96.
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or discounts of any kind.27 9 "[W]here exclusivity has been for-

mally accepted the granting or not of a rebate is in the final analysis irrelevant ..

.280 The Court also condemned under article

86 a reciprocal dealing agreement between La Roche and its largest customer, Merck.28 ' The implication of these condemnations
is that any contract or sales method which provides an incentive
for purchasers to buy exclusively from the dominant firm is abusive;2s2 no matter how commonly such contract or sales method is
used in the industry it is not "normal."
Although the Court's third characteristic seems to indicate that
structural analysis is called for, it undertook only very limited
structural analysis in Hoffmann-La Roche. It is doubtful that the
Court meant that detailed structural analysis was necessary, that
it understood what could be learned from structural analysis, or
that either the Commission or the Court could undertake indepth structural analysis. 28 3 The Court's only discussion of struc-

ture was its inquiry into the duration of the contracts and its remark that there was excess capacity in vitamin production. 28 4 Its

characterization of the former is questionable, and it did not explain what it thought was the significance of the latter.
Finally, the Court treated its fourth requirement, that the challenged conduct hinder the maintenance or growth of competition,
in the same cavalier manner as it has used with the far less stringent requirement of article 86(c). However, even if the Court had
seriously addressed this issue, little improvement in the quality of
the decision would have likely resulted, because the Court has an
unusual conception of competition. In discussing a clause contained in most of La Roche's rebate agreements, under which the
customer was entitled to buy from any other supplier that offered
a lower price if La Roche chose not to match that price, the Court
commented that La Roche had the power to decide whether it
279. Id. at 550-51, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 298.
280. Id. at 541, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 291.
281. Id. at 548-49, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 296-97.
282. See 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 551, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 298.
283. Cf. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 91, at 478-86 (discussing the use of structural analysis in determining the legality of requirements contracts and exclusive dealing agreements under section 3 of the Clayton Act).
284. See 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 539-40, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 28990; cf. id. at 583, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 244 (structural analysis by Advocate
General). See Zanon, supra note 243, at 314.
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would "permit competition. ' 28 5 By "competition," the Court apparently means the instances of commercial rivalry in which the
non-dominant competitor gets the business. If the dominant firm
wins, what has taken place is not competition, but anticompetitive conduct. The Court treats as antithetical that which benefits
the dominant firm and that which promotes "competition. ' 28 6
Neither the Commission nor the Court considered La Roche's
efficiency justifications. The Advocate General did, but only in a
superficial way that demonstrated his lack of understanding of,
and hostility toward, both efficiency and common business
practices. 8 7
In Hoffmann-La Roche, as in the Sugar case, the Court should
have focused on the primary-line injury to competition and not
on the secondary-line effects. Those customers who entered into
La Roche's rebate agreements were paid for their loyalty. They
simply were not harmed by the agreements. Even if market conditions had changed so significantly that they would be better off
buying significant portions of their vitamin needs from other suppliers, they were free to do so and forego the rebates. 28 8 Since
rebates were not paid by La Roche in advance as SZV had often
done, the customers never had to make restitution to La Roche.
Similarly, the favored customers' competitors were not harmed by
the La Roche rebates. Those who bought large quantities of vitamins from La Roche presumably could have obtained the rebates
by entering into fidelity agreements. Smaller customers'
purchases were not equivalent, at least to the extent of cost differences, which might well have justified the one to five percent
differentials.
It is instructive to note that the Advocate General felt compelled to accept the Commission's contention that the "competitive disadvantage" requirement of article 86(c) does not necessi-

285. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 545-46, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 294.
286. See id. at 551, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 298. There the Court said that
an abuse was indicated by the dominant firm's benefitting from a provision even
if it had been agreed to by a powerful customer which also benefitted from it.
287. See 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 584-85, 587-91, 26 Common Mkt. L.R.
at 245-46, 249, 251-52 (Opinion of Advocate General).
288. Even those customers who had entered into contracts obligating them
to purchase a specified percentage of their requirements from La Roche could
purchase elsewhere; the only penalty for breach was the loss of the rebate. 1979
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 547, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 295.
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tate a finding of any adverse effect on competitive capacity.2 89 La
Roche had argued that there could be no effect on competition
between its customers because the amount of the discrimination
was so infinitesimal that it could not possibly affect the price of
the final products into which the vitamins were incorporated by
La Roche's customers. 290 The argument fared no better in the
EEC than it had before the United States Supreme Court in Morton Salt.29 1 The Court of Justice did not even address the issue,
for it apparently did not intend to be constrained by the statutory requirements.2 9 2
On the other hand, the across-the-board fidelity rebates may
have had significant anticompetitive effects by foreclosing sales
by other vitamin manufacturers. Had the Commission and the
Court concentrated their analyses on horizontal, primary-line injury, the Hoffmann-La Roche decision would have been more analytically defensible and possibly more enlightening.2 " 3
For example, in SmithKline Corporation v. Eli Lilly & Company, a practice similar to La Roche's was challenged under
section 2 of the Sherman Act. From 1964 through 1973, Lilly had
a complete, patent-protected monopoly of cephalosporins, a family of antibiotics. Lilly produced a range of cephalosporins, but its
most successful were Keflin and Keflex; Lilly's Kefzol ranked a
distant third.2 9 5 When its cephalosporin patents expired and competition arose, Lilly adopted a pricing plan designed to maintain
its premier position by tying sales of Keflin and Keflex, for which
there were no direct substitutes, with sales of Kefzol, which was
in competition with Ancef, SmithKline's generically equivalent
product. 29 6 Lilly offered a three percent rebate to hospitals that
purchased specified quantities of at least three of its

289. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 592, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 253-54
(Opinion of Advocate General).
290. Id. at 592, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at 253.
291. 334 U.S. at 47-51.
292. See Zanon, supra note 243, at 318-19.
293. Cf. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 547, 554-56, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. at
294, 301-02 (indicating the lack of focus).
294. 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978).
295. Id. at 1059.
296. Id. at 1061. Although the plan also was challenged as an illegal tie-in,
violating section 3 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act, the
court held that the plan was not illegal under those sections because it was insufficiently coercive. Id. at 1061 n.3.
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cephalosporins. The practical effect was that hospitals had to
purchase Kefzol instead of Ancef in order to get the rebate for
Keflin and Keflex, drugs they had to buy from Lilly. SmithKline
had to offer rebates of sixteen to thirty-five percent on Ancef to
offset the hospitals' loss of the three percent across-the-board rebate on Lilly's cephalosporins.2 97 The Third Circuit found that

this linking of products on which Lilly faced no competition with
the product which did face competition constituted the willful
maintenance of monopoly power because it threatened to destroy
the competition between Kefzol and Ancef by driving SmithKline
out of the cephalosporin market.298
3. Michelin
The most recent case developing the Community law of fidelity
rebates and quantity discounts under article 86 is Nederlandsche
Banden-IndustrieMichelin NV v. Commission of the European
Communities, 29 in which the Commission challenged the reductions from list price that Michelin granted its Dutch truck tire
dealers. Again, the case turned on the issue of characterizing the
reductions as fidelity rebates or quantity discounts; again, the decision was based primarily on article 86(c)'s prohibition of discrimination; again, the Court and Commission's focus was on secondary-line injury and unfairness to the dealers. In marked
contrast to Hoffmann-La Roche, however, the Court and Commission's solicitude may have been justified in Michelin, at least
as a matter of fairness and proper commercial relations between a
powerful manufacturer and its dependent dealers, although perhaps not as a matter of general economic welfare.
Michelin was the dominant tire manufacturer selling on the
Dutch market, with a fifty-nine to sixty-five percent share of the
297. Id. at 1061-62.
298. Id. at 1065. The Second Circuit has indicated that the same type of
pricing plan by Xerox, tying competitive and non-competitive products in a
joint discount arrangement, violates section 2. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645
F.2d 1195, 1200-01, 1212-13 (2d Cir. 1981) (denying recovery because the plaintiff failed to prove that the violation caused its damages). See also P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

112-13 (1982 Supp.).
299. 24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 353) 33 (1981), 33 Common Mkt. L.R. 643

(1981); N.V. Nederlansche Baden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission of the European Communities, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3461, 42 Common Mkt. L.R.
282 (1985).
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replacement market for truck and bus tires and a thirty-three
percent share of the automobile tire replacement market.300 Manufacturers commonly granted their dealers discounts from wholesale list prices. Michelin used two basic types of discounts: invoice and cash discounts, which were uniformly available to its
dealers, and annual bonuses, which varied from dealer to
dealer.30 ' These annual bonuses and the monthly or quarterly advances that were made against them were based upon the attainment of individual purchase targets. The Commission attacked
only the annual bonuses and not the invoice and cash discounts.
The Commission found the annual bonus plan abusive on two
grounds. First, it tended to tie the dealers to Michelin, thereby
foreclosing Michelin's competitors. Second, it constituted discrimination having adverse secondary-line effects. 3 0 2 In addition, the

Commission condemned a special .5% bonus on the combined
purchases of truck and bus tires and automobile tires in 1977; because the special bonus could only be earned by meeting a target
for the purchase of auto tires,303 the Commission characterized it
as using Michelin's stronger position in the bus and truck tire
market to promote sales of its automobile tires.
Although it is encouraging that the Commission has expanded
its focus to include the horizontal anticompetitive effects of the
discount and rebate plans of dominant firms, the quality of the
analysis would be improved if the Commission understood the economic and commercial effects of the practices being examined.
For example, two aspects of the bonus plan that especially troubled the Commission were the pressure placed upon dealers to sell
more Michelin tires and the dealers' uncertainty about what they
must do to qualify for the annual bonus. Each year a dealer's target was raised; Michelin sales representatives visited him regularly to check his progress and encourage him to sell more tires. 0 4
The pressure on the dealers often grew toward the end of the
year, in part because the failure of Michelin to confirm the target
levels in writing caused dealers to wonder whether they would
300.
50.
301.
302.
303.
304.

24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 353) at 36-37, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 649Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

37-38,
42, 33
44, 33
41, 33

33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 652-53.
Common Mkt. L.R. at 659.
Common Mkt. L.R. at 663.
Common Mkt. L.R. at 658.
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qualify at all.30 5 Michelin took advantage of this uncertainty by
pressuring the dealers to place a final large order to insure that
they would get the bonus for the entire year's purchases.3 0 6 Although the Commission's conclusion that there was significant
market foreclosure caused by the bonus plan was amply supported by the evidence, its open hostility toward a dominant
firm's encouraging heightened sales efforts by its dealers is
3 07
troubling.
The Commission's limited discrimination analysis was only
slightly more rigorous than that in previous cases. Basically, the
Commission recited the requirements of article 86(c) and proclaimed each of them satisfied.3 0 8 The Commission emphasized
the significance of its characterization of the bonuses as loyalty
rebates 3 °9 Because the difference in the bonuses was not negligible, it found an adverse effect on competition,310 reiterating its
unsupported view that discrimination between dealers strengthens the discriminator's dominant position-a view that evidences
the Commission's continuing confusion of primary and secondaryline injury and its failure to distinguish between anticompetitive
and exploitative abuses.3 11 The most encouraging aspect of the
Commission's discrimination analysis is that it was not really an
important basis of the decision.
The 1977 special bonus troubled the Commission because it
viewed this bonus as a Griffith-type leveraging of power in the
truck and bus tire market to gain an advantage in the more competitive automobile tire market. 1 2 If the Commission's understanding of the purpose or effect of this special bonus were correct, its conclusion that the special bonus violated article 86
would be unexceptionable. Such conduct also violates section 2 of

305. Id. at 39, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 655.
306. Id. at 41, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 658.
307. See id. at 39, 33 Common Mid. L.R. at 654.
308. Id. at 42, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 659.
309. Id. at 43, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 661.
310. Id. at 42, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 660.
311. Perhaps this indicates that the Commission is using a third operative
category of abuses, unfairness abuses, that neither strengthen nor exploit the
dominant position. See Temple Lang, Monopolisation and the Definition of
"Abuse" of a Dominant Position Under Article 86 EEC Treaty, 16 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 345, 357-58, 363-64 (1979).
312. 24 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L 353) at 44-46, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 66364, 666-67.
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the Sherman Act.3 13 Even if one were to accept the Chicago
School rejection of the Griffith theory that leveraging can be anticompetitive 1 4 the special bonus may have taken advantage of
Michelin's leverage in an exploitatively pernicious way. In 1977
Michelin faced a temporary shortage of truck and bus tires in
Holland.3 15 Rather than directly exploit this situation by temporarily raising prices, Michelin may have chosen to exploit its temporary power in the truck and bus tire market to increase sales
and profits in the automobile tire market. Analyzing Michelin's
conduct in this manner does not involve the sin of double counting, which so troubles former Professor Bork; rather, it focuses on
the market in which the power was exercised. Leveraging may
thus offend article 86's prohibition upon the exploitation of monopoly power, although it should not have been treated as an anticompetitive abuse or characterized as a violation of article
86(d).3 16
Several aspects of the Commission's decision are cause for concern. First, the Commission rejected, without consideration,
Michelin's contention that the bonus plan had an important efficiency justification.3 17 Second, the Commission commented that it
was clear that "a discount system under which, through financial
benefits, an undertaking in a dominant position attempts to prevent supplies being obtained from competitors" violates article
86.18 Since no rational firm would adopt a discount system that it
did not expect would increase its sales, necessarily preventing
those supplies being obtained from its competitors, all discount
plans would run afoul of this overbroad proscription. Does the
Commission really mean that any discount scheme which is successful is abusive? Finally, the Commission prohibited Michelin
from adopting any discount system to promote sales of truck and

313. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); SmithKline Corp. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978).
314. Bork notes that the Griffith analysis counts market power twice and
argues that this is deceptive because if in fact the company did have left-over
bargaining power, it would use the power to obtain a lower price. As a consequence, reciprocity is erroneously viewed as an economic danger. R. BORK, supra
note 170, at 257-59, 372-74.
315.

24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 353) at 39, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 655.

316. See'24 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 353) at 44, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 66364; 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3520-21, 42 Common Mkt. L.R. at 335-36.
317. 24 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 353) at 42-43, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 661.
318. Id. at 45, 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 666.
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bus tires unless the discounts reflected actual cost savings and
were confirmed in writing in advance.3

19

The Commission did not

differentiate between discriminatory and uniform discounts nor
between those set at single rate and those which are graduated.
Surely the Commission did not mean what it said! For instance,
Michelin granted a two percent cash discount to all its dealers.
What possible anticompetitive or exploitative effect could such a
discount have, even if it were not completely cost justified? Yet
the Commission's language would forbid it, although there is not
the least basis for doing so under article 86.
The Court of Justice upheld the Commission's findings that
Michelin's annual bonus plan foreclosed sales by its competitors
and helped maintain its dominant position, but rejected the other
conclusions of abuse. Although the Court excused Michelin's failure to confirm the bonus targets in writing because no dealer had
requested confirmation and the Commission had not shown that
the dealers were afraid to make such a request,3 20 the Court concluded that all of the circumstances showed that the system operated to pressure the dealers, to make them more dependent upon
Michelin, and to foreclose Michelin's competitors.3 21 The Court,

however, correctly determined that the Commission had not established any article 86(c) discrimination. The Commission admitted before the Court that it had mistakenly calculated many
of the instances of unequal discounts upon which it had relied.2 2
The Court accepted Michelin's contention that its discounts were
quantity rebates based upon each dealer's purchases, with only
justifiable variations.3 23 Finally, the Court rejected the attack
upon the 1977 special bonus, agreeing with Michelin that the
Commission had misunderstood its nature and purpose. Rather
than leveraging power from the truck tire market to that for car
tires, Michelin was merely seeking to compensate its dealers for
the loss of the truck tire bonus that the supply shortage caused.
This, the Court concluded, was not abusive. 24
The Court's Michelin decision is cause for hope, if not jubilation, because it may mark the beginning of a trend toward more
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id., 33 Common Mkt. L.R. at 665.
1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3514, 42 Common Mkt. L.R. at 330.
Id. at 3517-19, 42 Common Mkt. L.R. at 333-34.
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careful analysis and a tendency to focus on more important issues. If this trend continues, perhaps in some future case the
Court will conclude that article 86 is only violated by discount
and rebate plans that have anticompetitive effects or that involve
"unfair" exploitation of the dominant position.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Different pricing practices of dominant firms have been challenged as abusive, with remarkably different results. From the decided cases, it is possible to predict certain trends in the development of the EEC regulation of pricing by monopolists.
Article 86(a)'s ban on unfair prices can be violated by prices
unfairly high or unfairly low: both monopolistic and predatory
prices are outlawed. However, for unfairly high prices, the United
Brands decision may prove to be an illusory victory much like
Continental Can. Although the principle that monopolistic pricing is an abuse has been established and another weapon has
been added to the Commission's arsenal, that weapon is so difficult to use that it may sit upon the shelf gathering dust. The
Commission has indicated that it does not intend to engage in the
extensive investigation of costs necessary for meaningful price
regulation. In order to avoid this, in United Brands it tried to
bootstrap the easily established price differences into two violations, monopoly pricing under article 86(a) as well as price discrimination under article 86(c). Having failed, the Commission
must recognize that only by investigating the dominant firm's
costs can it expect to successfully defend a monopoly-pricing decision before the Court. With its acute shortage of economists,
accountants, and resources in general, the Commission is unlikely
to search actively for monopoly-pricing cases to investigate. Because most monopoly-pricing cases also involve discriminatory
pricing, as in United Brands, the Commission's emphasis will be
upon violations of article 86(c),with its easily satisfied checklist of
elements.
Predatory pricing is the kind of conduct that the Commission
probably will attack. Although the Court of Justice has yet to decide a predatory pricing case, there is every reason to expect it to
uphold a Commission finding of predation based upon evidence of
intent and harm. The Court is unlikely to impose cost-based tests
to hinder the Commission in such cases, though a finding that
prices were below the dominant firm's costs, meaning average total costs, will be damning evidence. Since allegedly predatory
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prices often are lower than those the dominant firm charges in
other markets, many predatory pricing cases could be decided
under article 86(c). Although the Commission did not rely heavily
upon the discrimination in deciding Akzo Chemie, it may place
more reliance on article 86(c) in future predatory pricing decisions. The complaint-driven nature of the EEC competition system assures an adequate supply of cases for full development of
the Common Market treatment of predation.
Complaints of discrimination violating article 86(c) will continue to be filed with the Commission. These have been the easiest of all pricing violations for the Commission to establish before
the Court. Costs are relevant only as a defense, and thus, probably must be proven by the defendant. In addition, since the Court
has read the competitive disadvantage requirement out of article
86(c) and does not measure equivalence rigorously, the only significant test is whether different prices were charged. Exploitative
price discrimination, particularly that involving different national
markets, will probably be held abusive; if the dominant firm has
erected barriers to segregate the markets, condemnation is sure.
Price differentials that arise from the application of discount or
rebate schemes will be held legal or abusive depending upon the
nature of those schemes. Quantity discounts, at least those based
on cost savings, will be upheld; fidelity rebates and similar plans
will be condemned. One may suspect, however, that often the
characterization may reflect the outcome desired, with programs
that have been satisfactorily justified being accorded a benign
label.
The Common Market's application of article 86 to the pricing
practices of dominant firms is subject to several criticisms. First,
the Commission's disclaimers notwithstanding, the EEC is flirting
with price regulation, as it must to halt exploitative pricing by
dominant firms. The Commission recognized in its United
Brands order that decrees forbidding the continuation of unfair
pricing must usually require some form of price reporting. The
Commission, in reviewing these reports, will have to analyze
changes in costs as well as prices. This oversight seems an unwise
use of the Commission's scarce resources, especially since one inescapable effect of successful Commission bans on exploitative
pricing is to maintain or strengthen the dominant position or to
retard its demise, thus producing further opportunities for abuse.
Although EEC authorities could argue that the Treaty makes the
policy choice to regulate prices rather than to permit supracom-
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petitive pricing and that the Commission is powerless to reject
this approach, the responsibility for the decision is not so easily
evaded. The language of article 86 is general, not specific, and
does not compel price regulation. Although the article prohibits
unfair pricing, "unfair" is a nebulous term. The Commission and
the Court could set a very high standard for exploitative prices to
be regarded as unfair. Additionally, the Commission certainly has
the freedom to determine how best to use its scarce enforcement
resources. 25 By this use of discretion the Commission most likely
322
will avoid becoming extensively enmeshed in price regulation.2 6
Second, the hostility of the Commission and the Court toward,
and their lack of understanding of, ordinary business practices
and the efficiencies those practices may produce holds potential
for great loss to the European economy. So does their inability to
distinguish between competitive and anticompetitive conduct. To
condemn an industry's most successful, innovative, and efficient
firm for its success, innovation, and efficiency threatens to deprive the competitive system of one of its most important
incentives.
Third, decisions resulting in wealth transfers from the poorer
countries in the EEC to the richer countries seem misguided. Although these effects may have been unintentional in the past,
that excuse is dead. EEC officials must come to grips with the
wealth transfers their policies are causing.
Fourth, the decisions ignore the likelihood of strategic adaptation to the analysis employed and the rules adopted. Dominant
firms will not merely avoid committing abuses, but also will act to
prevent their abuses being discovered, the Commission prosecuting them, or the Court upholding a finding of abuse. Several of
the EEC rules encourage strategic adaptation without elimination
of the abuse. This strategic adaptation produces economic waste
and competitive distortion, harmful effects which the EEC authorities have not considered in formulating their rules or methods of analysis.
EEC officials could learn important lessons from the experience
in the United States with price regulation. Outlawing monopoly

325. But see Metro-SB-Grossmirkte v. Commission of the European Communities, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, 22 Common Mkt. L.R. 1 (1978) (implying that the Commission has a legal duty to deal with every complaint). Temple Lang, supra note 95, at 49-50.
326. See Temple Lang, supra note 95, at 48-49.
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pricing causes undesirable structural effects because it discourages supracompetitive prices and accompanying monopoly profits
which would stimulate market entry and erode the dominant
firm's market share and power. Additionally, the unfortunate results of recent fascination in the United States with misleadingly
simple cost-based economic tests for predation should be a warning to use economic analysis as a servant and not to allow it to
become a master, and especially the sole master, of the outcome.
Perhaps the most significant lesson involves price discrimination.
In this area, more than any other, the Community should eschew
the follies of the United States courts and Congress. To create a
Robinson-Patman type statute-with its blatantly anticompetitive results-from article 86(c) would be most unfortunate. Early
signs that the Common Market was doing this have waned somewhat, but the EEC's expressed concern with fairness, defenseless
competitors, and vulnerable customers keeps alive the potential
for a full-fledged European Robinson-Patman debacle.
The Community appears to be at a crossroads in its treatment
of pricing by dominant firms. The early, mechanical approach has
been partially supplemented by more thoughtful, albeit frequently incorrect, analysis. Important effects are being recognized, while trivial ones are downplayed. Economic vocabulary
has crept into the decisions, and there are attempts to use economic concepts and tools. All of these are cause for hope.

